Marquette University Law School Faculty Blog

Law professors, like everyone else, have good days and less good days. Then, sometimes, law professors have special days. In these days, something truly unique happens, something that makes law professors especially grateful for their roles as mentors and educators. This past week, I had probably one of the most special days in my law professor career, and it was not about getting tenure, getting promoted or the like (all very special days I can promise!). It was about the success of a student I had the privilege to mentor and supervise, who was one of my very best students, and who made me so very proud. So what happened? An academic dream: the Supreme Court of the United States cited the comment that my former student Lina Monten wrote in 2005, and that we published in the Marquette Intellectual Property Review.

Here is a little more “technical” background. The Supreme Court recently issued its opinion in Kirtsaeng v. John Wiley & Sons, a closely-watched copyright case concerning the issue of whether the “first sale” doctrine of copyright law applies to imported works. Justice Breyer wrote the majority opinion holding that it does, and Justice Ginsburg wrote a dissent (on behalf of herself and Justices Scalia and Kennedy) arguing that it does not. In the course of her dissent, Justice Ginsburg argued that the United States has long taken the position in international negotiations that copyright owners should have the right to prevent importation of copies of their works that they manufactured and sold in another country. (Slip op. at 20-21.) In support of her argument, Justice Ginsburg cited two items, one of which was the comment published in the Marquette Intellectual Property Law Review, written by then-student, now-Marquette Lawyer Lina M. Montén, entitled The Inconsistency Between Section 301 and TRIPS: Counterproductive With Respect to the Future of International Protection of Intellectual Property Rights? (9 Marq. Intellectual Property L. Rev. 387 (2005)). I supervised the comments, which started as a paper that Lina wrote for the International Business Transaction class that I taught during spring 2005.  Read more »

The Supreme Court heard oral argument this morning in Kirtsaeng v. John Wiley & Sons, Inc., despite Hurricane Sandy’s imminent arrival and the fact the entire federal government in Washington DC is shut down today. Kirtsaeng is a copyright case raising the issue, argued two years ago in Costco Wholesale Corp. v. Omega, S.A., of whether the first sale doctrine applies to third-party imports of goods manufactured under the authority of the copyright owner abroad. (Costco resulted in a 4-4 affirmance due to Justice Kagan’s recusal.) In more plain English, if someone in the United States purchases legitimate copies of some item abroad that has a copyrighted work somewhere in it, can they import those items into the United States and resell them here without violating the Copyright Act? The specific issue in Kirtsaeng involves used textbooks, but it could just as easily apply to watches with a copyrighted logo on the back (the good at issue in Omega), shampoo with a copyrighted label on the bottle (Quality King v. L’Anza), or any product with copyrighted software in it.

Costco indicates the mischief that could come about from a holding saying that the first sale doctrine does not apply to imported goods. There is zero chance that Omega was actually concerned about the redistribution of its copyrighted logo, located inconspicuously on the backs of its watches, as opposed to the grey market arbitrage of the watches themselves, which of course are not copyrightable. But mischief that does not rise to a constitutional level doesn’t tell us what the law is. The arguments in Kirtsaeng focus on the meaning of the phrase “lawfully made under this title.” Section 109(a) provides that:

Notwithstanding the provisions of section 106(3), the owner of a particular copy or phonorecord lawfully made under this title, or any person authorized by such owner, is entitled, without the authority of the copyright owner, to sell or otherwise dispose of the possession of that copy or phonorecord.

Kirtsaeng, the petitioner, argues that “lawfully made under this title” means “made with the authority of the copyright owners as required by Title 17, or otherwise authorized by specific provisions of Title 17,” a theory Kirtsaeng borrows from the Solicitor General’s brief back in Quality King. Wiley argues that because Title 17 does not have extraterritorial application, “lawfully made under this title” must mean “lawfully made in the United States pursuant to Title 17.”

That’s the question that cert. was granted on, but the whole debate strikes me as off-target. As a result I don’t think either side’s briefs really grapple with the problem here. Read more »

Last week I bemoaned how the Seventh Circuit had thoroughly botched the already confusing state of affairs that is the elements of a prima facie copyright infringement claim. But as a bonus, the Peters v. West opinion also had troubling things to say about what is now required to successfully plead a copyright infringement claim under the new “plausibility” regime announced by the Supreme Court in Twombly and Iqbal.

As a refresher, here’s how the Peters court defined the element of infringement (the other element for a claim of copyright infringement being ownership of a valid and registered copyright):

Fundamentally, proving the basic tort of infringement simply requires the plaintiff to show that the defendant had an actual opportunity to copy the original (this is because independent creation is a defense to copyright infringement), and that the two works share enough unique features to give rise to a breach of the duty not to copy another’s work.

Note that the court is discussing what the plaintiff must ultimately prove, which even after Twombly and Iqbal is not necessarily what the plaintiff must allege. Swierkiewicz v. Sorema, which distinguished between those two, is still good law; Iqbal simply requires that the plaintiff allege enough to make a claim plausible, which may or may not require pleading specific facts. Nevertheless, many courts even pre-Twombly have been requiring plaintiffs to march through the elements in their complaints, and now post-Iqbal, each of those elements must be “plausible.”

So what does a plaintiff, according to the Seventh Circuit, now have to plead in order to plausibly allege infringement? Read more »

In my previous post, I dissected the problematic recent Seventh Circuit copyright decision in Peters v. West. I won’t recap that long post here, except to say that the Seventh Circuit appears to have collapsed the traditional two-part inquiry for infringement in the prima facie case for copyright infringement to one part, with proof of access as a weird (and optional?) hanger-on. As the Peters court summarizes the test that will govern going forward: “[P]roving” — and, I guess, pleading — “the basic tort of infringement simply requires the plaintiff to show that the defendant had an actual opportunity to copy the original . . . , and that the two works share enough unique features to give rise to a breach of the duty not to copy another’s work.”

There are at least three bad consequences to this: it gives jury determinations to the judge; it makes the already controversial “sliding scale” doctrine incoherent; and it sounds the death-knell for substantive limits on liability for copying outside of fair use.

First, the two different sub-elements of the infringement half of the prima facie case have been understood at least since 1945, and even in the Ninth Circuit’s jumbled version of the test, to allow a division of labor between judge and jury in a copyright infringement case. Actual copying, including (if necessary) a showing of “probative similarity,” is a merely forensic task, one that stands at the gate of the field where the ultimate liability determination will be fought out. The issue is to determine whether there’s been any copying at all as a factual matter. It is to copyright law as “causation” is to negligence law. I may have been speeding, but if I didn’t actually hit your car, the case is over. As a forensic rather than policy determination, courts have long allowed the component works to be examined in microscopic detail for evidence of actual copying, including hearing from expert witnesses. After receiving this evidence, the judge can determine that there’s no genuine issue of material fact as to actual copying and grant summary judgement for the defendant — or nowadays, I suppose, can determine on a motion to dismiss that the complaint does not adequately plead a plausible case of actual copying.

The other “substantial similarity” test is supposed to be much different than that, one that the jury is especially adept at determining, at least in a music case like this one. Read more »

At least, not if Mudville is populated by copyright professors; for the mighty Seventh Circuit has struck out. In Peters v. West (Kanye West, that is, or as LEXIS is now abbreviating the case name, “W.”), the Seventh Circuit, in an opinion written by the highly regarded Judge Wood, has badly bungled the already confused test for establishing a copyright infringement claim. I’ma let you finish, Judge Wood, but Judge Newman had one of the best explanations of this test of all time.

The elements of a prima facie copyright infringement claim have long been confusing to students, lawyers, judges — pretty much everyone. (A brief copyright lesson follows; if this is old hat to you, skip 4 paragraphs down.) Essentially, there are only two elements: ownership and infringement. But the second element is broken down further into a set of sub-elements, and courts have long had difficulty explaining the content and the relationship of the various sub-elements clearly. The basic idea, however, long ago expressed in Second Circuit opinions by Judges Learned Hand and Jerome Frank, is that proving infringement is supposed to be a two-part process: proving that the defendant actually copied material from the plaintiff’s work, and proving that the amount copied passes some sort of threshold for materiality.

There are two significant points of confusion with the test. Read more »

Professor Boyden’s Internet Law class and a legal internship, where many of my responsibilities dealt with online trademark protection of my employer’s brand name, opened my eyes to the complicated nature of brand protection on the internet.

As the internet, and internet crime, develops, trademark owners must confront the abuse of their marks as domain names in two particular ways. First, cybersquatting is registration of a domain name that contains a trademarked term with the intention of selling the domain name to the owner of the trademark at a bloated price. 15 U.S.C. § 1125(d) (2006). Second, typosquatting is the registration of a domain name that includes an intentionally misspelled famous trademark. Typosquatting creates revenue for the squatter by capitalizing on the recognition of the mark through the placement of advertisements on the page, so that a fraction of a cent is generated by each page view from visitors attempting to reach the mark’s owner’s legitimate page. Shields v. Zuccarini, 254 F.3d 476, 483 (3d Cir. 2001).

Read more »

In law school, we learn to “think like a lawyer.” As the fictional Professor Kingsfield put it, we develop “the ability to analyze that vast complex of facts that constitute the relationships of members within a given society.” We learn the rules under which those relationships operate, and the theory and reasons behind how we handle things when those relationships go sour. We begin to see the world around us in a different light – the light of the law.

Torts got me first. I was seeing standards of care, the illusive reasonable man, and potential negligence wherever I went – except at my house, where we always behave reasonably and prudently. Contracts are no longer something I quickly sign and shove back across the counter. Don’t get me wrong, I only read them for entertainment value before signing. After all, I want my iPhone, and there is a reason they’re called adhesion contracts. Property’s spell struck when I encountered a private driveway, which crossed a county bike trail, which ran along a We-Energies right of way. I’ll leave constitutional law and criminal law to your imaginations, but I will say that I haven’t had to invoke any of my rights, nor has anyone had to read them to me. Finally, although I didn’t encounter it in real life, civil procedure did haunt my dreams for a while. Fortunately, new areas of the law from my summer session courses have started to edge out the 1L voices in my head.

One course, intellectual property, has me seeing trademarks and copyright disputes all over the place. Like everyone else, I had been seeing trademarks everywhere for my whole life, I just didn’t know what a trademark was. As I learned trademark law, I remembered a story from my hometown’s recent past. It was big news at the time, but it is likely unfamiliar to people who are not from Racine, Wisconsin. (For those of you not familiar with Racine, it is a lovely city located about 30 minutes south of Milwaukee. Among other things, Racine features an award-winning beach, excellent local government, and kringle.) I’ll have more on the local government in a future posting. For now, I want to talk about pastries.

The story begins long ago, when a wave of Danish immigrants settled in Racine. Like other immigrant waves throughout our history, the Danes brought their food here. In this case, they brought kringle, a large, tasty, pretzel-shaped pastry. At some point, Racine bakers swapped the pretzel shape for an oval shape and the Racine kringle was born. For decades, Larsen’s, Lehmann’s, O & H, and Bendtsen’s bakeries prepared and sold delicious Racine kringles. There was plenty of room in the market for all of the competitors to do well, and the good people of Racine, and many lucky visitors, ate their fill of these tasty treats. All was well in kringle-land.

Then, in the 1990′s, as the rise of online sales was taking kringle beyond our borders, a new player emerged on the scene: Racine Danish Kringles (RDK).  Read more »

I recently came across an interesting cluster of similar statements from copyright decisions in the late 1950s and early 1960s, which struck me as significant:

It is a curious fact that although the Copyright Law has remained without relevant change since 1909 this case should present a question both basic and novel. Does either the Copyright Act or the common law provide copyright owners with a remedy against non-manufacturing sellers of unauthorized phonograph recordings of copyrighted songs?

Shapiro, Bernstein & Co. v. Goody, 248 F.2d 260, 262 (2d Cir. 1957).

The question is whether an unpaid manufacturer of copyrighted goods, which are alleged to be defective by the copyright proprietor who has ordered them, may sell them in satisfaction of his claim for the contract price without infringing the ‘exclusive right’ of the proprietor to ‘publish * * * and vend the copyrighted work,’ 17 U.S.C. § 1(a); there is a related question as to the rights of persons who have already purchased some of the goods from the manufacturer. It seems exceedingly strange that these questions should arise for the first as is apparently the case, one hundred and seventy-three years after the initial grant of copyright protection by Congress, 1 Stat. 124 (1790), and two hundred and fifty-four after the Statute of Anne, 8 Anne, c. 19 (1709). Whether the lack of precedent is attributable to an unusually high standard of dealing, and of solvency, on the part of copyright proprietors and those manufacturing for them, or to an unaccustomed and unexpressed previous consensus in the profession as to the applicable rule of law, it is none the less remarkable.

Platt & Munk Co. v. Republic Graphics, Inc., 315 F.2d 847, 849 (2d Cir. 1963).

This action for copyright infringement presents us with a picture all too familiar in copyright litigation: a legal problem vexing in its difficulty, a dearth or squarely applicable precedents, a business setting so common that the dearth of precedents seems inexplicable, and an almost complete absence of guidance from the terms of the Copyright Act, 17 U.S.C. § 1 et seq.

Shapiro, Bernstein & Co. v. H. L. Green Co., 316 F.2d 304, 305 (2d Cir. 1963).

These are opinions by three different Second Circuit judges, in order, Hincks, Friendly, and Kaufman. They deal with separate issues, but they’re all related in a way — they all deal with the liabilities of ancillary parties to some sort of infringement. And in all three the judges express surprise that these questions haven’t been litigated to death, or resolved by statute, or both, already.

This surprise requires two conditions. Read more »

On Friday I mentioned Tim Wu’s op-ed last week, which asked if machines “have a constitutional right to free speech”? The question is posed in such a way that the obvious answer seems to be “no,” so it naturally drew responses which simply pose the question the other way: Timothy Lee at Ars Technica asks, “Do you lose free speech rights if you speak using a computer?”, and Julian Sanchez suggests that Wu’s argument would effectively remove First Amendment protection from any speech communicated via a machine. Paul Levy and Eugene Volokh similarly argue that while machines obviously don’t have speech rights, the people using the machines do, and Wu’s examples (e.g., Google’s search results) are the speech of the humans who designed the algorithm behind it.

I think the distinctions here are trickier than any of these pieces, including Wu’s, let on. (Frank Pasquale appears to agree.) My own view, as suggested in my previous post, is that at least for copyright purposes, the more the machine contributes to the substance of the content, the less it is the speech of the humans behind it. But the distinction both First Amendment law and copyright impose is binary: something is either your speech or not your speech. Trying to figure out exactly where that transition occurs — even in principle — is difficult.

Let’s set up a spectrum of possibilities. So here’s the spectrum (click to enlarge):

Read more »

Tim Wu had an interesting op-ed column in Wednesday’s New York Times: Free Speech for Computers? Wu’s op-ed is in part a response to a paper co-authored by Eugene Volokh, entitled “First Amendment Protection for Search Engine Search Results.” (See also Volokh’s response; criticism by Tim Lee and Julian Sanchez.) Volokh and his co-author, Donald Falk of Mayer Brown, argue that search results, for example those produced by Google (which commissioned the paper), should be treated as speech worthy of First Amendment protection. (Hail, Search King!) Wu argues that this argument threatens to “elevate our machines above ourselves” by “giv[ing] computers . . . rights intended for humans.” The purpose of the First Amendment, Wu writes, is “to protect actual humans against the evil of state censorship.” But computers don’t need that protection: “Socrates was a man who died for his views; computer programs are utilitarian instruments meant to serve us.” Wu concludes: “The line can be easily drawn: as a general rule, nonhuman or automated choices should not be granted the full protection of the First Amendment, and often should not be considered “speech” at all.”

This debate intrigues me, not so much for how it applies to Google (although that is interesting too), but for how it applies to video games. Read more »

David Brooks had an interesting column earlier this week in which he asked, “Why aren’t there more liberals in America?” According to Gallup Poll numbers, about 41% of Americans self-identify as conservative, versus 36% moderate and 21% liberal. This strikes Brooks as a bit of a puzzle, since the financial crisis and the economic downturn would seem to support liberal beliefs in some ways. Brooks’s answer: “Americans may agree with liberal diagnoses, but they don’t trust the instrument the Democrats use to solve problems. They don’t trust the federal government. A few decades ago they did, but now they don’t. Roughly 10 percent of Americans trust government to do the right thing most of the time, according to an October New York Times, CBS News poll.”

Brooks goes on to speculate about the basis for that distrust: “Why don’t Americans trust their government? It’s not because they dislike individual programs like Medicare. It’s more likely because they think the whole system is rigged. Or to put it in the economists’ language, they believe the government has been captured by rent-seekers.”

This all sounds very familiar. It’s essentially the basis of the current critique of copyright law: that Congress has become beholden to a few stakeholders, and as a result modern copyright law has become unmoored from any legitimate purpose and now simply apportions rents to favored dinosaur industries.

But even that description of the situation is not dark enough. Read more »

The House Judiciary Committee held a markup hearing on the Stop Online Piracy Act, H.R. 3261, the bill that is quickly shaping up to be this year’s big copyright battle. I’ve written two prior posts on the bill, Part I and Part II.

This is a good opportunity to recap where I came out at the end of my last post: SOPA in its then-current form was very troubling. The most troubling part was Section 103, which seemed to have been drafted with two inconsistent goals in mind, as if the co-authors were Dr. Jekyll working alongside Mr. Hyde: on the one hand Section 103 appeared to offer limited supplemental remedies in suits brought under existing copyright and trademark law, and on the other it appeared to significantly modify existing law by creating a free-form cause of action and a notice-and-takedown regime that went far beyond what the DMCA enacted thirteen years ago. For the reasons I stated in the post, I believe that the former reading — the Jekyll version if you will — had to be the correct one, because both the alleged new cause of action and the apparent notice-and-takedown regime were radically under-specified. I’m still concerned that critics of the bill are cementing an overly broad reading of it — the Hyde version — by not even acknowledging the Jekyll reading as a possibility. (This is akin to a concern that copyright scholar Jessica Litman has recently expressed as well, that copyright critics may ironically worsen the doctrines they are concerned about by asserting the most damaging interpretation.)

In addition to all that, SOPA as introduced had an overly broad scope for (what I argue are) the supplemental remedies — they appeared not just to apply to sites infringing in the U.S. but as a practical matter immune to traditional means of enforcement — the so-called foreign “rogue sites” — but to any website, anywhere, even one that a U.S. court would have no problem directly enforcing a preliminary injunction against with contempt sanctions. That is, even if Section 103 were amended to make clear, as I believe it should be, that the remedies involving domain names and ad networks are supplemental means of enforcement, it did not expressly limit itself to situations where there is a need for such extraordinary remedies. I would hope that courts would nevertheless apply such limits anyway, but that might be asking a lot from a court unfamiliar with the policy debates.

In advance of today’s hearing, SOPA’s main sponsor, Rep. Lamar Smith, offered a “manager’s amendment” to the bill making several changes. Does Smith’s amendment fix the above problems? Yes and no. Read more »