At first blush, one would not think that Barney Frank and Stephen Hawking would have anything in common. The first is the Chairman of the House Financial Services Committee, and is currently conducting hearings on the regulatory reform of the financial markets. The second is the noted University of Cambridge professor of theoretical physics and the author of the best selling book A Brief History of Time.
However, in my mind both men are associated with the Second Law of Thermodynamics. This law of physics states that the entropy of an isolated system always increases over time. Stephen Hawking described it in more comprehensible terms in A Brief History of Time:
It is a common experience that disorder will increase if things are left to themselves. . . . In any closed system disorder, or entropy, always increases with time.
Therefore, when I think of Hawking, I think of someone who can explain the Second Law of Thermodynamics. When I think of Barney Frank, I think of someone who is desperately trying to avoid its operation.
I would contend that all forms of market regulation follow the Second Law of Thermodynamics. In each case, a comprehensive statutory scheme is enacted as law, it imposes a closed system of rules on market actors, and over time the scheme inexorably breaks down. Federal securities regulation, which began with the Securities Act of 1933 and the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, provides the perfect case history of this principle in action. Continue reading “Regulation and the Second Law of Thermodynamics”
The confirmation hearings for Judge Sonia Sotomayor are over, and the reviews have been overwhelmingly negative. The public tuned in expecting a discussion of the nominee’s qualifications and a debate on the role of the Supreme Court in our constitutional system. What they got, instead, was a battle of metaphors.
Republican Senators on the Judiciary Committee compared the ideal Supreme Court justice to a baseball umpire. An umpire confines himself to calling balls and strikes without allowing his preference for one team or the other to influence the performance of his duties. The umpire metaphor is designed to support the view that judges apply the law objectively and even handedly.
While the umpire metaphor expresses a commendable aspiration, one can’t help but wonder whether this is an attainable goal. Continue reading “The Umpire, the Wise Latina, and the Cabinetmaker”
The National Law Journal recently reported that the law firm of Howrey & Simon has adopted an innovative training program for new associates. Newly hired lawyers will serve a two year “apprenticeship” prior to being fully integrated into the law firm. This program will reduce the number and the compensation of the law school graduates hired by the firm, and it is part of Howrey’s overall program to eliminate “lockstep” salary increases for its associates.
Lawyers in Howrey’s apprenticeship program will be paid significantly less than the going rate for first year associates at other large law firms. During their first year, the new associates will take firm sponsored classes on legal writing and gain practical experience by working on pro bono matters. During their second year, the associates in the program will spend several months “embedded” at client sites where their work will be charged at a reduced billing rate. The law firm’s managing partner compared the apprenticeship program to the training programs typically employed in the medical and accounting professions.
The Howrey program provides an opportunity to reconsider the entire continuum of legal education: a process that begins with undergraduate instruction, continues through law school, and is perpetuated by continuing legal education requirements. From time to time, each stage in the continuum comes under scrutiny, as Rick Esenberg’s post on Reengineering Law School illustrates. In my opinion, the continuum should be viewed holistically when we evaluate whether we are succeeding at training competent and ethical members of the legal profession. Law schools, law firms and the state bar all need to cooperate in order to ensure that there are no gaps in the preparation that new lawyers receive as they start their careers. As a member of the Wisconsin Legal Education Commission in 1996, I argued in favor of a program of mandatory skills-based CLE instruction for recent bar admittees. Many of our students are undoubtedly pleased that the State Bar chose not to implement this particular Commission recommendation.
Given my predisposition in favor of practical training, I should be supportive of the Howrey apprenticeship model. Instead, I find myself troubled. In particular, I am wary of the idea of embedding future corporate lawyers within a client’s legal department for any significant period of time. Continue reading “The Apprentice”
I authored an opinion piece in support of Judge Sonia Sotomayor’s nomination to the Supreme Court that was published in the June 28, 2009 edition of the Milwaukee Journal Sentinel. You can read the piece here (and you can read a “dueling” piece authored by Rick Esenberg here).
What follows is a deconstruction of my own op ed piece. The final product as it appeared in the newspaper has its origins in the fundamentals of logic and rhetoric. Law students, in particular, may be interested in the way in which I employ several classic techniques of persuasive writing in order to make my case.
Believe in Your Argument: It is not necessary to have an angel for a client, but it helps. The most accomplished persuasive writing techniques will not hide the fact that your argument is a stinker. My task is to persuade the reader that my belief – that Judge Sotomayor is a moderate jurist who should be confirmed to the Supreme Court-is one that they should adopt as well. If I do not believe my own argument, I will not succeed in convincing the reader.
Know Your Audience: My language is directed towards the non-specialist, so I consciously avoided legal technicalities. Also, I assume that the average newspaper reader will be skimming the text rather than fully engaged in my arguments. Therefore, I utilize simple and direct sentences as opposed to rhetorical questions or complex syllogisms that require greater concentration to follow. Continue reading “Anatomy of an Op Ed”
When you are at your Fourth of July cookout or fireworks display this week, see if anyone mentions the Declaration of Independence. If they do, ask “which Declaration of Independence?” After all, there are more than one.
In her 1997 book American Scripture: Making the Declaration of Independence, historian Pauline Maier describes the events leading up to July 4, 1776 and points to multiple “other” Declarations of Independence issued by local legislative bodies earlier that year. Declarations were issued in a variety of places, including Buckingham County (Virginia), Charles County (Maryland), and Natick, Massachusetts. In most cases, these “other” Declarations took the form of instructions from the citizens of a particular geographic area to their elected representatives in the state legislature or in the Continental Congress. After recounting the unjustified treatment of the colonies by the Crown, these documents authorize the peoples’ representatives to vote in favor of severing ties with England. However, some of these Declarations take a different form, such as a judge instructing a grand jury on the source of their legal authority in the absence of a Royal Governor. Continue reading “Which Declaration of Independence?”
I often wonder why it is that some people disagree with my political views. My logic is unassailable, the breadth of my historical knowledge is unmatched, my moral foundation cannot be questioned, and I am far more charming and better looking than my opponents. Why don’t they agree with me?
My summer project was to seek an answer to this mystery. I chose three books to read that I thought would provide some insight into the ideological fault lines that seem to run through every facet of our daily lives (and indeed seem to run through this very blog). What follows are the lessons that I have learned. I suppose other readers might draw different lessons. My recommendation is that you read these books for yourself.
My first goal was to understand why the “big government” charge persistently leveled by Republicans against the Obama Administration seems to resonate with some people, but not with others. Some clues are provided by Gary Wills in A Necessary Evil: A History of American Distrust of Government. Writing some ten years ago, Wills documents the origin and growth of the arguments against “big government” and in favor of individualism and local control over the course of our nation’s history. Over time, he argues, these disparate strands of thought have coalesced into a more general anti-government creed. The specifics of this creed – the belief that amateur, local and voluntary conduct creates greater public well being than professional, centralized, and mandatory regulation — resembles the political philosophy currently espoused by many of President Obama’s critics.
Continue reading “Why We Fight”
In an earlier post, I compared the nominations of Judge Sonia Sotomayor and Judge Robert Bork in order to make some observations about the role of stare decisis and its relationship to judicial activism. My argument was that a respect for the wisdom of past practice and a preference for incremental change will allow Judge Sotomayor to avoid being tagged as a radical jurist unworthy of confirmation. In contrast, Judge Bork had a record that left him vulnerable to such a charge (even if unwarranted). Also worthy of mention here is Professor David Papke’s earlier recollection of Professor Bork in the classroom.
In the discussion that follows, I will continue to use the Sotomayor/ Bork comparison in order to draw out the manner in which the Supreme Court’s interpretation of the Second Amendment threatens to undermine the very philosophy of constitutional interpretation that is most closely associated with Judge Bork.
Opponents of the Sotomayor nomination have seized on the Second Amendment as an issue with which to attack her. Portraying her as an opponent of the constitutional right to own firearms is a strategy that will certainly succeed in energizing the base of the Republican Party. If she rises to the bait during her confirmation hearings, and expresses any skepticism over the correctness of the District of Columbia v. Heller case – striking down the DC handgun ban– then efforts to paint her as a liberal jurist who is out of the mainstream might gain some traction with the public. Continue reading “Bork Reconsidered, Part II”
As my students in Constitutional Law are well aware, my Con Law professor in law school was Archibald Cox. If you doubt me, you can look it up on his Wikipedia entry, where someone saw fit to memorialize that fact. No one ever bothered to ask me what grade I received. At this time of the year, when many of my students are coming by my office to discuss their final grade, it may be comforting for some to learn that Professor Cox gave me a “B.” I still think that he undervalued my class participation.
The Supreme Court ruled yesterday in Caperton v. A.T. Massey Coal Company that the Due Process Clause of the United States Constitution is violated by the refusal of a judge to recuse herself when the disproportionate campaign contributions of a litigant on behalf of that judge create a serious, objective risk of actual bias. Rick Esenberg has posted on some of the issues raised by the majority opinion here. For me, the most interesting part of the case was actually the dissent by Justice John Roberts. In it, Justice Roberts objects to the uncertainty that federal judges will encounter as they attempt to apply this constitutional right in future cases with disparate fact patterns. In a bit of theatricality worthy of Gilbert & Sullivan, the Chief Justice’s dissent presents a list of 40 questions that the majority opinion leaves unanswered.
The Chief Justice makes a rather stark assertion: “The Court’s inability to formulate a ‘judicially discernible and manageable standard’ strongly counsels against the recognition of a novel constitutional right.” He cites to Veith v. Jubelirer in support of this statement, which of course held no such thing. In fact, as a plurality opinion devoted to the issue of what constitutes a “political question,” the Veith case is a fairly slender reed upon which to rest such a sweeping proposition. Continue reading “Justice Roberts Has A Little List”
In my third year of law school, the speaker at our law review banquet was a Boston Globe reporter who talked about a book he was writing on the Robert Bork confirmation battle. I didn’t pay much attention to his speech, other than to complain loudly to all within hearing that a judge would have been a much more prestigious invitee than a reporter. Ethan Bronner’s book, Battle for Justice, came out the following year and has since been recognized as a classic treatment of the modern Supreme Court nomination process.
The nomination of Judge Sonia Sotomayor provided me with a convenient excuse to reread Bronner’s treatment of the Bork confirmation debate and to consider whether the lessons learned during that experience have any application to the Obama Administration’s first Supreme Court nominee. The first, and most obvious, conclusion is that extreme rhetoric about the nominee has become an accepted tactic by the opponents of the party in power. Senator Edward Kennedy’s denunciation of “Robert Bork’s America” as a land where women are forced to seek back-alley abortions and lunch counters are re-segregated will rightly be remembered as the low point in a long political career. Similarly, the former Speaker of the House, Newt Gingrich, has had his reputation irrevocably damaged by his casual labeling of Judge Sotomayor as a “racist.” However, in both cases, the extreme rhetoric served the larger purpose of energizing the base against a nomination and simultaneously engaging the attention of the public at large by raising the stakes of the confirmation. Continue reading “Bork Reconsidered, Part I”
This is my final posting as the Faculty Blogger for the Month of May. Thanks to everyone who has commented on my posts and a special thanks to my colleague Michael O’Hear.
As we await word on the nomination of Justice Souter’s replacement on the Supreme Court, many observers are wondering whether the change in personnel will make any difference in the Court’s jurisprudence. The consensus seems to be that the direction of the Court will not change significantly. Depending upon whom President Obama nominates, however, there is one area where Justice Souter’s replacement may make a difference. Continue reading “Does Justice Souter Make a Difference?”
Senator Charles Schumer recently announced plans to introduce the “Shareholder Bill of Rights Act of 2009.” This bill is a compendium of corporate governance reforms that shareholder activists have been advocating for many years. Among other things, the bill would require companies to elect the entire board of directors each year, rather than putting only a portion of the board up for a vote. It would also require that directors receive a majority of the votes cast before being allowed to serve, and the bill would make it easier for shareholders to nominate their own director candidates to run in opposition to the candidates nominated by management.
Senator Schumer’s bill is best understood as embodying the principle that, when it comes to corporate governance, more democracy is always better. The assumption is that corporate governance will improve in tandem with increased shareholder voting power. I question that assumption.
First, more democracy might actually lead to worse directors. Continue reading “Legislation of the Year . . . If the Year Is 1950”