The Partisan Implications of ‘Low Turnout’ Have Flipped in Wisconsin

There’s a growing conventional wisdom that the two parties have flipped in their relationship to voter turnout. Now, it seems, Democrats are strongest in lower-turnout elections and Republicans do best when turnout is highest.

This is a real paradigm shift from not too long ago. During the Obama years, Democrats enjoyed a clear majority among potential voters broadly defined, but this majority depended on the adults least likely to participate. Republicans, on the other hand, had great strength with the most regular voters. For this reason, Obama could handily win Wisconsin (and the nation) in 2008 and 2012, but the Republican Tea Party wave dominated in 2010.

Here are a few more interesting data points in support of that emerging conventional wisdom.

Turnout always drops from a presidential election to the following gubernatorial election two years later, but the size of the decline varies from place to place. I was curious: does the decline in voter turnout correlate with changes in vote margin?

To answer this, I ran a regression comparing each municipality’s change in voter turnout with the change in vote margin between elections for president and governor.

The results are striking. In 2002, 2006, and 2010, a 1% decline in voter turnout from the previous presidential election predicted a more than 0.1 increase in the Republican vote margin for governor. This advantage dwindled in 2014 and reversed in 2018 and 2022.

In both of Tony Evers’ elections, a 1% decline in voter turnout predicted a significant increase in support for Evers, relative to Trump in the same municipality two years earlier.

graph showing the influence of a 1% decline in voter turnout from the previous presidential election on gubernatorial vote margins

The same dynamic affects Supreme Court races. The people most likely to show up in an April nonpartisan election are older, highly educated, and more wealthy. These demographics used to lean Republican; now they lean Democratic.

In April 2025, the liberal candidate Susan Crawford won 55% of the vote to conservative Brad Schimel’s 45%. Recall that in November 2024, Trump received 50% of the vote to Harris’ 49% in Wisconsin.

All the evidence I’ve seen shows that Crawford’s improvement over Harris is mostly due to who showed up. A survey from Blueprint Research found that 52% of voters in April 2025 had voted for Harris the previous November, and 46% had voted for Trump. Likewise, the researchers at Split Ticket analyzed ward-level election results and concluded, “roughly 70% of Susan Crawford’s win margin was attributable to changes in who was voting, rather than changes in how people voted.”

Here’s an example of all these trends taken from my hometown, the City of Milwaukee.

This graph shows that in the early 2000s, Democrats did best in presidential elections, a little worse in gubernatorial elections, and much worse in elections for Wisconsin Supreme Court.

In 2002, the Democratic candidate for governor won Milwaukee by 39 points, and in 2004 the Democratic presidential candidate won it by 44. Right in between those two elections, in 2003, the conservative candidate for Wisconsin Supreme Court outright won the City of Milwaukee by 5 points.

line graph showing margins among city of Milwaukee voters in races for president, governor, and WI supreme court

Since the early 2000s, things have changed. Democratic presidential margins in the city topped out at 60 points in 2012. Since then, they’ve dwindled slightly. Democratic candidates for governor have just kept climbing. Evers’ margin in 2018 matched Clinton’s share in 2016. But Evers’ Milwaukee margin of victory in 2022 reached heights not even achieved by Barack Obama.

The increase in support for liberal supreme court candidates among Milwaukee voters has been even more spectacular. Liberal candidates were consistently winning the City of Milwaukee by the 2010s, but in 2016, the liberal candidate still trailed Hillary Clinton by 34 points. In 2020, the liberal Court candidate trailed Biden by just 7 points among Milwaukee voters. In 2025, the liberal judicial candidate’s margin of victory exceeded Harris’ 2024 margin by 11 points.

Something fundamental changed in the years following Trump’s first election. Now, the smaller the electorate in Milwaukee, the more liberal it seems to be.

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The prohibitive cost of new construction in Milwaukee

Four single-family homes on the 2000 block of W Vliet St

The photo above shows four of Milwaukee’s newest houses. They were built in 2024 in the Midtown neighborhood by the large affordable housing developer Gorman and Co.  Gorman’s goal for the project was to “serve as a proof of concept that market-rate, owner-occupied hous[ing] can work in the area,” according to reporting by Urban Milwaukee.

Instead, it looks like the original developers will lose their shirts on this project—yet another example of how impractical market rate construction remains in most of Milwaukee.

Back in 2021, Gorman expected the houses to cost around $250,000 to build, with sale prices somewhere under $200,000. To make up the difference, the city created a TIF district contributing $75,000 per home, funded by future property taxes from these new homes.

The market changed dramatically in the early 2020s with construction inflation far outstripping the consumer price index. Those “250k” houses wound up costing “approximately $400,000 to build” according to a Gorman official speaking near the project’s competition in August 2024.

Reflecting the 60% increase in costs, the houses originally went on the market at listings of $359,900 and $369,900 (for the two different floor plans). 324 days after the initial listing, the first home finally sold on April 4, 2025. The closing price: $281,000, 24% less than the initial asking price, which was itself below the reported development cost.

How much does new construction really cost?

It can be tough to find detailed, current, and public information about construction prices. Recently, I acquired the applications for all 47 proposed developments applying for affordable housing tax credits in Minnesota during 2024. These applications include a detailed development budget with dozens of line items for specific costs. I’ve requested the same information from Wisconsin but have not received it. Some legal fees likely vary between the states, but I expect development costs to be basically similar between Minnesota and Wisconsin.

This table shows a simple cost breakdown across all the projects. I’ve removed acquisition costs from these calculations, because many affordable housing projects get the land for free. Leaving aside any land costs, the median housing unit cost $414k to build. Of that cost 75% went to the construction budget, 10% to the developer, 7% in professional fees (architect, permitting, legal, etc.), and 6% to financing costs (insurance, interest, etc.).

table showing the median budgeted development costs of 47 projects applying for affordable housing tax credits in Minnesota in 2024

The next graph shows the per-unit total cost vs. the number of units in the development for each project. There is a wide range in costs per project, but generally, larger projects are cheaper. Projects with 50 or more units had a median per unit price of $389,000, compared with $454,000 for those with fewer than 50 units.

The absolute cheapest proposed development was a 65-unit senior-housing apartment building with a per-unit cost of $300,000. Any family-sized housing development inevitably cost more.

How do total construction prices translate to monthly rents? Imagine if you had to pay off a $300,000 unit at a fixed 6% interest rate over 30 years. The principal, interest, and taxes alone would be $2,415 a month. For the median $414,000 unit, the bare minimum PITI and tax payment would be $3,333. In reality, costs are even higher. Occupancy is always less than 100% and apartment developers must budget for repairs, maintenance, and insurance.

scatterplot showing the per unit development cost vs the number of units in each project

Where can the market afford to build new housing in Milwaukee?

This is one of the most underappreciated facts about housing in cities like Milwaukee. We don’t build housing because, in many (if not most) places, you cannot sell a new house for what it costs to build it. And without significant subsidizes, you cannot charge the rents required to finance the construction of a market-rate apartment building.

Let’s take $350,000 as the bare minimum price required to build a standard detached, single-family home. Citywide, just 7% of houses are worth this much.[i] This improves to 43% among houses built since 2000. Still, most ‘modern’ houses in the city are not worth what it would cost to replace them.

This simple fact, in most neighborhoods houses cost more to build than you can sell them for, explains why the city has so many empty lots. In total, I count 1,500 non-tax-exempt empty lots where you could build a house right now under existing land use rules.[ii] 38% of those lots allow single family development under the existing rules, 44% duplexes or triplexes, and 17% quadplexes or more. The quadplex-eligible empty lots are overwhelmingly in the poorest areas of the city. I count 150 lots in just the 6th and 15th aldermanic districts which a private developer could buy right now and build a quadplex on by-right.

map showing the locations of taxable vacant lots colored by max zoned density

This is the basic conundrum: vacant parcels are common in neighborhoods where prevailing values are far below the level needed to finance new construction. Where home values are high enough to finance new construction, buildable lots are scarce. While it’s possible that developers could tear down existing houses to build new ones, this is practically unheard of in Milwaukee, even in neighborhoods where denser development is already legal.

For example, there are over 3,500 single family homes which could be replaced with a quadplex under existing zoning and lot size rules. But I cannot find a single instance of a quadplex replacing a single family home in my parcel records going back to 1990.

Accessory Dwelling Units

For these reasons, I’m most optimistic about accessory dwelling units as a way to add housing units in Milwaukee. They are cheaper to build and can fit in those neighborhoods of the city where property values are highest.

Also, ADUs are nothing new for Milwaukee. I count about 1,200 city lots classified as a “single family” or “duplex” but which hold multiple residentially buildings. Sometimes called “carriage houses,” they are almost entirely in the older neighborhoods surrounding downtown.

According to this 2025 analysis by Angi, the home contractor marketplace, the typical ADU costs $180,000 to build, with prices ranging between $40,000-$360,000. Costs are cheaper for internal basement or garage conversions and higher for new construction.

I wanted to know how many homeowners in Milwaukee might be able to afford costs in this range, so I modeled the home equity of every local homeowner as of January 2025.[iii] Citywide, the median homeowner has accrued $128,000 in home equity. 66% have at least $100,000 and 26% have $180,000 or more. In total, I estimate 18,000 Milwaukee households have enough home equity to finance the average cost of an ADU.

How many would actually do it? I don’t know. In Seattle, where ADUs are far more expensive, they still permit close to 1,000 a year. Right now, in Milwaukee, we’re averaging fewer than 50 new single family homes or duplexes across the entire city in a typical year. We lose about the same number of units to conversions of duplexes into single family homes. Even a small number of people choosing to build ADUs would be a meaningful change from the status quo.


[i] I’m using the 2024 assessed value and adjusting it by the Wisconsin Department of Revenue’s 0.9024 equalized assessed value ratio for the City of Milwaukee.

[ii] I calculate this based on the lot’s current zoning classification and its lot size. Some lots may have idiosyncratic dimensions which further reduce the allowable density.

[iii] I have data on the purchase date and price of every owner-occupied house in the city. To calculate accrued equity, I subtract the owner’s modeled remaining principal from the 2024 equalized assessed value of the property. I model remaining principal by assuming that the owner paid 5% down, received a 30-year fixed-rate mortgage at prevailing interest rates, and has stayed current on their payments without refinancing. Obviously, individual circumstances will vary from the average predicted by the model.

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The 2025 Election Might be Wisconsin’s New April “Normal”

Democrats across the country hailed yesterday’s victory of Susan Crawford over Brad Schimel as a decisive rejection of Elon Musk and Donald Trump. Certainly, Schimel embraced the connection between himself and the president throughout his campaign for a seat on the Wisconsin Supreme Court.

As I look at the results, I am unconvinced that the April 2025 election represents a turn against Trump among voters who supported him in November. Instead, I think the real story might be something even worse for the Wisconsin GOP, if less thrilling for national Democrats. This might just be the new normal for April elections.

Crawford won 55.0% of the vote according to unofficial election-night data. In 2023, the Democratic-endorsed candidate won 55.4%, in 2020 55.2%, and in 2018 55.7%. The lone exception is 2019, when Brian Hagedorn (a swing vote, but supported by Republicans) won a narrow victory by holding the liberal candidate to 49.7%.

Doubtlessly, persuasion played some role in Crawford’s victory. As more data becomes available, we’ll be able to draw clearer conclusions about how much. But, at a high level, you don’t need a story about persuasion to explain this election. A ten-point victory for the liberal candidate has become the normal outcome in Wisconsin’s April elections. To understand why, we have to look at the two party’s changing relationship to voter turnout.

Voter Turnout has Never Been Higher

Half of Wisconsin adults voted in the April 2025 general election for the state supreme court. It is difficult to emphasize how unusually large this turnout was. In all likelihood, this is the greatest share of adults to ever vote in one of the state’s April elections. Two years ago, in April 2023, 40% of adults voted in the election of Janet Protasiewicz which flipped the ideological balance of the court.

That year’s turnout was itself extremely high for a spring election not featuring a presidential primary. Turnout is typically highest when the spring election coincides with contested presidential primaries for both parties, as last occurred in 2016. In that year, about 47% of adults voted. We have to go all the way back to the 1960s to find similarly high levels of turnout among the voting age population, which did not yet include 18-20 year olds.

In fact, Wisconsin’s 50% turnout rate in the formally nonpartisan April 2025 election was higher than the adult turnout rate of 38 states in the 2022 midterms.

The sky high turnout this April is part of a general trend in Wisconsin politics throughout the years since Trump’s first election. The only gubernatorial election with a higher adult turnout rate than 2022 was 2018. Among presidential elections,  2024 had the highest turnout on record (2020 was the third highest, following 2004).

Wisconsin’s electorate is just plain extremely engaged. Whether measured as a share of total or eligible adults, no state had a higher turnout that Wisconsin in 2024. Here’s another superlative: since 1856, when the modern party system began, no state has been as closely divided between Democrats and Republicans across three consecutive presidential elections as Wisconsin in 2016, 2020, and 2024.

Scour American history and you’ll struggle to find an example of state as hyper-engaged with, and narrowly divided by, electoral politics as Wisconsin in the present moment.

Most observers, myself included, think Wisconsin’s high turnout in 2024 helped push Trump to his narrow victory, thanks to his particular popularity among infrequent voters. In April 2025, high turnout pushed the Democratic-endorsed candidate Susan Crawford to a 10-point victory over the Republican-endorsee, Brad Schimel.

If this seems like a paradox, consider how different the two “high turnout” electorates were. Just over a million more people voted in November 2024 than April 2025. A majority of the million voters who stayed home are probably Republicans, or at least Trump supporters.

Here’s a crude, but useful, mental model. Imagining lining up all of Wisconsin’s roughly 3.4 million voters in order of likelihood to vote. The first million lean most strongly Democratic, the next million less so, and the final million tilt more Republican. In February 2025, about half a million voters showed up to vote in the State Superintendent primary and 65% of them voted for Democratic-aligned candidates. In April 2025, 2.4 million participated and 55% voted for the liberal. In November 2024, 3.4 million voted, and the electorate was evenly divided, giving both Trump and Tammy Baldwin 1-point victories.

When I was a college student, in the early 2010s, the mantra among Democrats was “If everyone votes, we win.” When 2.2 million people voted in Wisconsin’s 2010 gubernatorial election, Republican Scott Walker won by 7 points. When 3.1 million people voted in Wisconsin’s 2012 presidential election, Obama won by 6 points. Two years later, when 2.4 million voted, Walker won reelection by 6 points.

Republican strength in lower-turnout elections gave them a structural edge in the state Supreme Court, whose elections may only be held in April. Conservative candidates won 4 of 6 such races held from 2008 through 2016, and the 2017 reelection of a conservative justice wasn’t even contested by a liberal. In the years since 2017, however, Democratic-backed candidates have gone 4 for 5. If they win the next two races in 2026 and 2027, they could hold a 6-1 majority on the court.

I can’t tell if either party has fully internalized this shift yet. Musk’s high-profile  shenanigans—offering voters cash to pose with photos of Schimel and advertising random drawings of $1 million prizes—struck me as the kind of thing a campaign might self-consciously do to appeal to low propensity voters.

On the other hand, both Trump and Musk celebrated the landslide passage of a referendum adding Wisconsin’s existing photo ID voting requirement to the state constitution. Trump wrote, “This is a BIG WIN FOR REPUBLICANS, MAYBE THE BIGGEST WIN OF THE NIGHT. IT SHOULD ALLOW US TO WIN WISCONSIN, LIKE I JUST DID IN THE PRESIDENTIAL ELECTION, FOR MANY YEARS TO COME!”

Recently, I completed my own analysis of the photo ID requirement’s impact on voting access in Wisconsin. My conclusion was that almost everyone has such an ID, so the practical effect of the requirement is small. Its introduction in 2016 has not prevented the state from setting turnout records.

Still, certain populations are less likely to hold an ID. These include poor people and young people not enrolled in college—decreasingly core Democratic constituencies. All else being equal, poor Black adults in Wisconsin are actually more likely to have a photo ID than poor white adults. I suspect this reflects concerted efforts by Democrats and their allies to help Black residents get their needed identification documents.

Hurdles to convenient voting access once worked to the benefit of the Republican party in Wisconsin, whether deliberately or not. Now, the calculus appears reversed. The best chances for a GOP candidate will appear in an electorate of 3 million or more. As any Democrat working on campaigns in the Obama years could tell you, winning elections by maximizing turnout is possible, but hard.

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