The Decline in Support for Democratic Candidates among Black Milwaukeeans is Easily Exaggerated

A recent New York Times opinion piece, “Inside the Rise of the Multiracial Right,” described growing support for Republican politicians among Black, Latino, and Asian Americans. The article offered Milwaukee as a particular example, writing, “In Milwaukee, the unity of the Black Democratic vote is splintering – along with the institutions that held it together for so long.”

As evidence, the author quotes 5 Black Milwaukeeans disillusioned with the Democratic Party for various reasons, but the article includes not a single statistic about election results in the city. Likely, this is because the facts don’t match this narrative. In Milwaukee, the decline in support for Democratic candidates among Black voters has been very slight—noticeably less than the national average.

Across the nation overall, Pew estimates that 91% of Black voters cast a ballot for Clinton in 2016, 92% voted for Biden in 2020, and 83% for Harris in 2024. Those estimates were made using validated-voter survey data. The progressive data firm Catalist used a modelled version of the national voter file to estimate that Clinton won 93% of Black voters, Biden 89%, and Harris 85%.

I lack access to either of those kinds of data for Milwaukee County specifically. But Milwaukee’s extremely high degree of racial segregation means that patterns in ward election results reveal much about how different demographic groups vote.

A simple approach is just to measure how the county’s majority Black, white, and Hispanic wards voted. I calculated each ward’s majority using census block redistricting data (and cubic spline interpolation for intercensal years).

Majority Black wards gave the Democratic presidential candidate 90% of the vote in 2000, 88% in 2004, 93% in 2008, 94% in 2012, 93% in 2016, 91% in 2020, and 90% in 2024.

Compare that slight decline with the pattern in majority Hispanic wards. They gave the Democratic candidate 76% in 2000, 74% in 2004, 80% in 2008, 86% in 2012, 83% in 2016, 78% in 2020, and 72% in 2024.

Majority white wards moved in the opposite direction, growing more Democratic with time. They gave the Democratic presidential nominee 52% in 2000, 53% in 2004, 58% in 2008, 56% in 2012, 60% in 2016, 63% in 2020, and 63% again in 2024.

line graph showing the vote in majority black, white, and latino wards in Milwaukee county during elections for governor and president

The simple ward-majority approach reveals clear patterns, but it hides the size of some changes. For instance, many non-Hispanic white people live in majority Hispanic wards, so, if those white people grow more Democratic as Latinos grow more Republican, the ward-majority calculation will underestimate the rightward shift among Latino voters.

For a more rigorous approach, I ran a regression model predicting Democratic vote share in each ward with independent variables for each racial group’s share of the adult population along with interaction terms for each individual election. In the model, 2000 is the base year.

The model predicts that a hypothetical 100% non-Hispanic white ward would’ve given the 2000 Democratic presidential candidate Al Gore 44% of the vote. Every 1 percentage point increase in the Black share of the population correlates with a 0.5 point increase in Gore’s share of the vote. Every 1 point increase in the Hispanic share correlates with a 0.3 point increase for Gore.

Over time, Democrats improved with white voters in Milwaukee County. The model predicts that Obama would’ve won about 48% of the vote in a hypothetically entirely white in 2008. Biden would’ve won 52% in 2020 and Harris 56% in 2024.

The graph below shows how the model’s coefficients changed for the Black and Hispanic population share in subsequent years, relative to 2000. Relative to 2012, we see a clear shift toward the Republicans among both groups, but the shift is about four times as large for Hispanic voters as Black voters. Each of Trump’s elections saw a large increase in support among Hispanic voters. Among Black voters, Trump’s improvement was much smaller overall and statistically insignificant between 2020 and 2024.

dotplot showing the estimates and error bars for the change in coe4fficients, relative to 2000, for a 1-point increase in Black or HIspanic pop share on a Democratic candidate vote share

Here is what the election data for Milwaukee County shows us. Black voters are by far the mostly Democratic-leaning group, followed by Hispanic voters, then white voters. This order has remained the same over the past 25 years, while the gaps between these groups have lessened.

Milwaukee County’s white voters probably gave Bush a majority over both Gore and Kerry. Since then, white voters in the county have moved left, now giving Democratic candidates a comfortable majority.

At the same time, Hispanic voters first trended Democratic, giving Obama large victories, with his peak popularity coming in 2012. Trump made strong gains with Milwaukee’s Latino population in each campaign.

Black voters in Milwaukee County shifted only slightly toward Trump, giving him a bit more of the vote in 2016 than Romney received in 2012. Another small shift toward Trump followed in 2020, but from 2020 to 2024 no statistically significant shift is evident.

As I’ve written elsewhere, Wisconsin’s electorate varies from the national average in a few ways. No state has been as narrowly divided in three consecutive presidential elections as Wisconsin in Trump’s three campaigns. Turnout dropped nationally but increased here from 2020 to 2024. Although I lack data measuring this, I suspect that per capita campaign spending rivals any historical precedent as well. And throughout the Trump era, the rightward turn among Milwaukee’s Black voters has been muted compared to the national change observed by Pew and Catalist.

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Introducing an Extremely Detailed Map of American Workers

a screenshot of the LODES Map tool

Mitchell Henke and I are pleased to share a new tool mapping the homes and workplaces of American workers. LODESMap.com allows you to quickly visualize how many workers commute between each county, county subdivision, census tract, or block group.

Not only does the tool allow viewers to quickly move between higher and lower levels of aggregation, it also includes data from 21 years in spatially integrated geographies. You can measure how worker flows have changed between two municipalities without worrying if boundary changes confound the comparison. Data is currently available from 2002-2022. We will add 2023 data once it is published by the Census Bureau, likely in September 2025.

Here is a short demonstration of the tool to get you started.

LODES Map makes it easy to save and share maps by simply copy/pasting the URL, which continuously updates as you pan, zoom, and select different geographies or menu options. Sending someone the URL will show them an identical map to the one you are viewing.

The entire project is open-source. See this technical overview or the Github repository for details. Our technical approach was inspired by Dan Snow’s OpenTimes project.

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Popular Supreme Court Decisions, Inflation Pessimism, and other Themes from the July Marquette Law School Poll

Plus 1k adults share their biggest concerns about the country

The latest national survey from the Marquette Law School Poll is out now. Here are just a few of the interesting results we found. For more, read our press release about national politics here, our Supreme Court press release, or our complete topline and crosstab tables. At the last link you’ll also find our new Trend Toplines file, which includes tables and graphs showing how the responses to each question have changed over time.

The Supreme Court’s decisions were popular this term.

Majorities of adults favored the Supreme Court’s rulings in all 7 of the major cases we asked about from the past term.

  • Uphold TX law requiring proof of age to access adult websites: 75% favor
  • Require due process for those subject to deportation: 73% favor
  • Uphold TN ban on transgender treatment for minors: 71% favor
  • Allow parents to opt school children out of lessons: 71% favor
  • Uphold law requiring TikTok sale: 60% favor
  • Require religious tax exemption for Catholic Charities: 59%
  • Limit district court use of nationwide injunctions: 56% favor

Overall, 49% approved of the Court’s job performance and 51% disapproved. This is a four-point drop in those approving, driven by a large (13-point) drop-off among Democrats.

Back in the summer of 2021, the parties scarcely differed in their views of the court. This changed rapidly, particularly following the Dobbs decision overturning Roe v Wade. In the latest poll, 83% of Republicans approve of the Supreme Court’s job vs 20% of Democrats and 45% of independents.[i]

Trump’s overall job approval is stable but varies a lot by topic.

Approval of Trump’s job performance ranges from +8 on border security to -30 on tariffs, inflation, and the cost of living.

Pessimism about inflation

Opposition to immigration and frustration with high inflation helped elect Trump in 2024, and initially Trump enjoyed support for his policies on both these issues.

In December 2024, shortly after winning the election, 81% of Trump voters anticipated that his policies would decrease inflation. This fell to 75% in February, 67% in March, 59% in May, and 58% in July.

Among all adults in July, just 28% believe Trump’s policies will decrease inflation and 60% expect an increase. 65% percent predict that “inflation and the cost of living will increase” over the next 12 months, while just 18% expect it to decline.

Support for deportations is waning

Since early 2024, we’ve asked “Do you favor or oppose deporting immigrants who are living in the United States illegally back to their home countries?” Phrased this way, support for deportations grew after Trump’s election, reaching 68% favoring deportations in March with 32% opposed. In July, support for deportations fell to 57% with 43% opposed.

Views on deportations are highly dependent on how the question is phrased. Throughout this period, we have also asked, “Do you favor or oppose deporting immigrants who are living in the United States illegally back to their home countries even if they have lived here for a number of years, have jobs and no criminal record?” Put this way, support for deportations has never exceeded 44% and stood at 38% in July 2025.

Most people (55%) think the U.S. is “mostly deporting immigrants who have no criminal records,” while 45% believe mostly immigrants with criminal records are being deported. July is the first time we’ve included this question.

Themes in open-ended responses

Unlike our Wisconsin state polls, all survey respondents complete our national polls online. This allows us to ask open-ended, free-response questions. Since December, we’ve asked, “What do you [like/dislike] about Donald Trump?” In July, we added a new question. “What is your biggest concern about the country these days?”

You can read, search, sort, and filter all 1,005 responses at this link. This is an exercise I find invaluable in understanding what voters (and non-voters) are actually thinking.

Here are a few of my impressions from the free responses:

  • The balance of open-ended responses has shifted modestly against Trump, tracking his slow decline in overall job approval. In December 2024, 51% named things they both liked and disliked about Trump, while 12% didn’t dislike anything and 35% didn’t like anything. In July, a similar number, 49%, list likes and dislikes, but the those who don’t like anything grew to 40% and those who don’t dislike anything fell to 8%.
  • If I had to describe the content of the “biggest concern” question in one word it would be “fear” or “anxiety” even more so than “anger,” which was also present in many responses.
  • Ninety-one people spontaneously mentioned going to war as among their top concerns for the country.
  • Many answers described social divisions and frustrations with other Americans. Elsewhere in the survey, 56% said that “generally speaking, most people can’t be trusted.” This is the highest level mistrust we have measured in 24 surveys going back to September 2021. Our open-ended explorer tool allows you to filter answers by the respondent’s level of trust in others.
  • Over 90 people spontaneously mentioned something related to immigration, ICE, or deportations as among their biggest concerns. Of these, 58% were generally supportive of Trump’s policies, 31% were opposed, and the views of 11% were unclear or unclassifiable.
  • 13 people, 11 of them Republicans, spontaneously mentioned Jeffrey Epstein, always in criticism of Donald Trump. Our survey was in the field from July 7-16, with most interviews completed by July 9th. The Department of Justice published its memo ending the Epstein investigation on July 7th.

[i] These figures are for unleaned party ID, where independents who lean to a party are still counted as independents. The press release shows figures for leaned party ID. I use the unleaned party ID in this graphic because it has a longer time series.

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