A Reminder: You Can’t Subpoena Non-Party ISPs for Emails in Civil Suits

I ordinarily wouldn’t blog about an unpublished short opinion from a magistrate judge in the Northern District of Mississippi (even though great things do come from there), but I view this as the leading edge of a wave of such opinions. In J.T. Shannon Lumber Co. v. Gilco Lumber, Inc., 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 104966 (N.D. Miss. Aug. 14, 2008), Magistrate Judge S. Allan Alexander quashed the plaintiff’s Rule 45 subpoenas on Microsoft, Google, and Yahoo, which sought the “entire contents” of the email accounts of three of the individual defendants, employees of Gilco.

In addition to the ridiculously overbroad nature of the requests (all of the emails in their personal accounts?), J.T. Shannon’s subpoenas ran up against the Stored Communications Act (SCA), Title II of the Electronic Communications Privacy Act. The SCA prohibits a non-party ISP from disclosing emails to litigants in a civil case without the consent of its subscriber. This law may seem counterintuitive to litigation attorneys, who are used to being able to subpoena whomever they want within the scope of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. But the SCA is not incredibly onerous; it just means you have to request that the party produce their own emails, not the ISP.

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“And He Causeth All, Both Small and Great, Rich and Poor, Free and Bond, to Receive a Mark”

So says Revelation 13:16. There are many interpretations of the wild events recounted in the Revelation to John. I am most familiar — and comfortable — with the view of the book as an allegory about persecution and redemption, but some folks think that it describes, in some more or less literal way, events that are still to occur.

I don’t know what the Amish view is but they — and certain other denominations — apparently read the text as calling for believers to resist receiving the forecast mark of the beast. This lawsuit, brought in federal court in Michigan, seeks relief from the federally sponsored program (voluntary for the states, but now adopted in Michigan) that requires the placing of RFID chips in cattle to facilitate the tracking of bovine and other livestock diseases. The plaintiffs make a variety of administrative law claims, as well as claims under the National Environmental Policy Act and the Fifth Amendment, but I’m interested in the claims made under the federal Religious Freedoms Restoration Act (RFRA) and a “supplemental” claim under the Michigan Constitution’s Free Exercise Clause. The requisite chips are claimed to require the plaintiffs to take the mark of the beast or to infringe their divinely ordained dominion over the cattle and all other living things. (Genesis 1:26-28.)

We know that the federal RFRA cannot be applied to the states. The plaintiffs try to get around that by arguing that Michigan is acting to implement federal law (and, it seems, receiving some type of federal grant in return for participation in the program, although the complaint is a bit unclear). If the feds are mandating this in some way as a condition of federal funding, then RFRA may apply.

Continue Reading“And He Causeth All, Both Small and Great, Rich and Poor, Free and Bond, to Receive a Mark”

Should Non-Precedential Opinions Be “Precedential But Overrulable” Opinions?

A post at Legal Theory Blog alerted me to Amy E. Sloan‘s new article, If You Can’t Beat ‘Em, Join ‘Em:  A Pragmatic Approach to Nonprecedential Opinions in the Federal Appellate Courts, 86 Neb. L. Rev. 895 (2008), available on SSRN.  Amy Sloan is an Associate Professor of Law and Co-Director of the Legal Skills program at University of Baltimore School of Law.  She is well known to legal writing professors, and to many law students, as the author of a popular legal research textbook, Basic Legal Research: Tools and Strategies.

Sloan makes an interesting argument, advocating that Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 32.1 be amended to assign non-precedential opinions a sort of “mixed” precedential value, specifically, that “non-precedential opinions [would be] binding unless overruled by a later panel’s precedential opinion.”  She contends that giving non-precedential cases this “‘overrulable’ status” would ensure that the opinions’ precedential weight would “correspond[] to their position within the traditional hierarchy of federal decisional law.”  

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