Standing up for the Rule of Law

Charles_Swift_--_Guantanamo_August_2008Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, which concerned the President’s authority to employ military commissions without congressional authorization, is among the most noteworthy of cases to have been decided by the Supreme Court in the last few years.  Last month, Professor Stephen Vladeck, who was part of the team that represented Guantanamo detainee Salim Hamdan before the Supreme Court, was part of the law school’s Constitution Day observance.  On Wednesday, we have the good fortune to host Lieutenant Commander Charles Swift, who represented Hamdan from the beginning.

Swift’s presentation promises to be compelling in at least two respects.  The first is that Swift will provide a first-hand account of the legal issues surrounding the war on terror via the story of his advocacy for recognition of the rights of Guantanamo detainees.  The second concerns the personal cost to Swift of his representation.  According to media accounts, Swift understood that the expectation was that he would simply assist Hamdan in entering a guilty plea.  But, Swift explained to the Seattle Post-Intelligencer,  “I didn’t volunteer for this. I got nominated for it. When I got it, I just decided to do the best I could.”  That resulted in a trip to the Supreme Court, in Swift being denied a promotion, and in turn to the end of his military career.  As Swift explained to a Bloomberg reporter, “If you start thinking about your career over your duty, it’s time to get out.”

For more information, and to reserve your spot, go here.

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Seventh Circuit Criminal Case of the Week: Reversing a Liddell Progress on Crack Sentencing

seventh circuitThe Seventh Circuit continues to struggle with the question of what it means for the federal sentencing guidelines to be “advisory.”  In United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220 (2005), the Supreme Court held that the then-mandatory guidelines system violated the Sixth Amendment.  The Court corrected the constitutional problem by converting the guidelines from mandatory to advisory.  Then, in Kimbrough v. United States, 128 S. Ct. 558 (2007), the Court confirmed what even the government had recognized and conceded: “advisory” means that a district court judge may impose a sentence outside the recommended guidelines range on the basis of a policy disagreement with the guidelines.

But the intermediate federal appellate courts have been slow to follow Booker to its logical conclusion — which is why Kimbrough was necessary in the first place.  Even after Kimbrough, several circuits, including the Seventh, have maintained that policy choices contained in § 4B1.1, the career offender guideline, remain binding on district court judges.  This is particularly important, and unfortunate, to the extent that § 4B1.1 contains the infamous 100:1 disparity in the treatment of crack and powder forms of cocaine.  That is a policy choice that district court judges ought to reject, and many doubtlessly would reject, if they were free to do so.

Last year, in United States v. Liddell, 543 F.3d 877 (7th Cir. 2008), a panel of the Seventh Circuit suggested that the court might be willing to reconsider its precedent on § 4B1.1.  But then Friday’s decision in United States v. Welton (No. 08-3799) slammed the door shut. 

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Seventh Circuit Criminal Case of the Week: The Limits of Constructive Possession

seventh circuitThe Seventh Circuit had only one new opinion in a criminal case last week, but, fortunately, it was an interesting one.  Under 18 U.S.C. § 922(g), it is a federal crime for felons to possess a firearm.  Proof of the crime is easy enough when a felon is found actually carrying a gun.  But what if the gun is nowhere on his person, but merely, say, in his home? 

In practice, the federal courts have interpreted the law expansively so as to encompass a broad range of circumstances beyond actual possession.  Thus, under the doctrine of “constructive possession,” a felon may indeed be convicted based on the discovery of a firearm in his home. 

But,  as the Seventh Circuit made clear last week in United States v. Katz (No. 08-2341), even the doctrine of constructive possession has its limits. 

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