Federal Law & Legal System – Page 67 – Marquette University Law School Faculty Blog

Is There a Female Bloc on the U.S. Supreme Court?

Post author:J. Gordon Hylton
Post published:May 29, 2012
Post category:Judges & Judicial Process U.S. Supreme Court

For several decades commentators have referred to the United States Supreme Court as being divided into liberal and conservative blocs. Now, suddenly, it looks like there may be male and female blocs as well.

(Since a “bloc” normally has to have at least three members, the possibility of a female bloc came into existence only with the 2010 appointment of Justice Elena Kagan.)

In the Court’s recent decision in Blueford v. Arkansas, the court decided by a vote of 6-3 that the Constitution’s Double Jeopardy Clause did not prevent the State of Arkansas from retrying the petitioner Bluefield on capital murder charges.

Blueford was accused of killing his girlfriend’s young child and was indicted for capital murder. During his trial, the Arkansas jury was instructed to consider also the lesser included offenses of first-degree murder, manslaughter, and negligent homicide. Ultimately, the jury was unable to reach a verdict and it reported to the trial judge that it was deadlocked on the manslaughter charge. The jurors also stated that they had voted unanimously against Blueford’s guilt for the capital murder and first-degree murder charges and did not vote on negligent homicide.

In response, the trial judge declared a mistrial. When the state chose to retry Blueford, his lawyers moved to dismiss the capital and first-degree murder charges, based on double jeopardy considerations. The trial judge denied the motion, and the Arkansas Supreme Court agreed that double jeopardy had not attached.

Having granted cert., the United States Supreme Court affirmed the decision of the Arkansas Supreme Court. By a vote of 6-3, the court held that double jeopardy does not bar retrying Petitioner for capital and first-degree murder since the jury had not made a final resolution of the charges in the initial trial. Chief Justice John Roberts delivered the opinion, joined by male Justices Scalia, Kennedy, Thomas, Breyer, and Alito. Female Justice Sotomayor filed a dissent, joined by Justices Ginsburg and Kagan.

Whether or not gender played a role in the 6-3 split is an interesting question, but has not yet been addressed by commentators. Of course, one case does not establish a pattern, but it will be interesting to see if the pattern in Blueford v. Arkansas repeats itself.

SCOTUS Decides Blueford, Declines Opportunity to Tighten Up Double Jeopardy “Manifest Necessity” Rule

Post author:Michael M. O'Hear
Post published:May 25, 2012
Post category:Constitutional Law Criminal Law & Process Public U.S. Supreme Court

On some apparently flimsy evidence of intent to kill, the State of Arkansas prosecuted Alex Blueford for the capital murder of his girlfriend’s one-year-old son. After deliberating for some time, the jury reported that it had unanimously voted to acquit on both capital murder and a lesser-included murder charge, but was deadlocked on another lesser-included offense, manslaughter. The judge sent the jurors back to deliberate further. Meanwhile, Blueford requested that the jury be given a new verdict form on which it could enter a partial verdict of acquittal on the greater offenses. The judge declined and, after another half hour of fruitless deliberations, declared a mistrial.

Can Blueford now be retried in front of a new jury on the capital-murder charge? The prosecutor announced an intention to try, and Blueford predictably objected on double jeopardy grounds. Yesterday, the United States Supreme Court overruled his objections, clearing the path for a second trial.

Speedy Trial Act Does Not Require Articulation of Ends-of-Justice Findings at Time Continuance Granted

Post author:Michael M. O'Hear
Post published:May 21, 2012
Post category:Federal Criminal Law & Process Public Seventh Circuit

In general, the Speedy Trial Act requires federal criminal trials to commence within 70 days of the time a defendant is charged or makes an initial appearance (whichever occurs laters). However, the Act also permits continuances that do not count against the 70 days when a judge finds “that the ends of justice served by [a continuance] outweigh the best interest of the public and the defendant in a speedy trial.” 18 U.S.C. § 3161(h)(7)(A). These ends-of-justice findings must be made on the record, either orally or in writing, but the statute does not specify when they must be made.

In United States v. Zedner, 547 U.S. 489 (2006), the Supreme Court indicated that the “best practice” is for the judge to articulate his or her findings at the same time that a continuance is granted. But are lower courts actually required to adhere to this “best practice”?

Earlier today, in United States v. Wasson (No. 10-2577), the Seventh Circuit affirmed that express ends-of-justice findings may await the defendant’s motion to dismiss on speedy trial grounds.