A Visit From the Ghost of Jury Service Past

What do you remember about November 29, 1995? That was the day when one of the jurors in Jesse Webster’s drug trafficking trial was out sick. The next day, with all twelve jurors again present, Webster was convicted. Many years later, Webster claimed in a petition for post-conviction relief that the eleven jurors who showed up on November 29 improperly proceeded with deliberations that day at the direction of a rogue bailiff.

In response to the petition, an investigator tracked down the jurors to ask them what they recalled about November 29, 1995. The interviews took place between 2001 and 2006. (Evidently, the investigation was not exactly a high priority.) The results, as the Seventh Circuit put it with considerable understatement in an opinion last week, were a “mixed bag”:

The first question was: “The court records show that on one day one of the jurors did not appear. Do you recall any such time when that might have occurred?” Seven jurors said they did not recall a juror being absent; four jurors said they did. Of the four who did remember a juror’s absence, three recalled that an alternate juror replaced the absent juror, a claim wholly unsubstantiated by court records. One of the four thought the juror was absent on the day before Thanksgiving; another claimed the juror was absent on the first two days of deliberations. Two correctly recalled that the absent juror was male; one said the absent juror was female. The second question was: “Do you recall being sent home early because of this juror’s absence?” The jurors answered either “no” or that they did not recall.

Continue ReadingA Visit From the Ghost of Jury Service Past

New Database Creates Time-Series Plots of Phrases in U.S. Supreme Court Opinions

Emory and Michigan State Law Schools have teamed up to create a free database that allows you to search for a term or phrase in U.S. Supreme Court opinions (1791-2005) and automatically generate a time-series frequency chart of the phrase’s appearance.

Continue ReadingNew Database Creates Time-Series Plots of Phrases in U.S. Supreme Court Opinions

Intent and the Eighth Amendment: New Restrictions on Sentencing in Cases of Felony Murder?

The felony-murder rule is perhaps the most troubling and controversial surviving relic of the common law of homicide, branding felons as murderers notwithstanding an absence of the sort of culpability otherwise required for a murder conviction.

If we are not going to make culpability-based distinctions in these cases at the guilt stage, then we ought to do so at sentencing, reserving the most severe sentences for those felony-murderers who actually intended to kill.  Some states do indeed recognize this distinction for sentencing purposes, but others do not.  For those in the latter category, the Eighth Amendment might conceivably provide some protection for relatively low-culpability felony-murderers.  The Supreme Court seemed to be moving in this direction in Enmund v. Florida, 458 U.S. 782 (1982), but then in Tison v. Arizona, 481 U.S. 137 (1987), essentially limited Enmund to felony-murderers who lacked any culpability as to the killing and were not even physically present at the time it occurred.

With the Enmund/Tison line of decisions in mind, I thought it quite interesting that the Supreme Court granted cert. last month in two new Eighth Amendment cases presenting contrasting fact patterns that might provide a good platform for further regulation of felony-murder sentencing.

Continue ReadingIntent and the Eighth Amendment: New Restrictions on Sentencing in Cases of Felony Murder?