Milwaukee Sheriff’s Religious Presentations to Deputies Violated Establishment Clause

Car_police Interesting public employment case. Here are the facts of Milwaukee Deputy Sheriffs’ Association v. Clarke, 08-1515 (7th Cir. Dec. 4, 2009):

Despite complaints from other employees, the [religious group, the] Centurions, made presentations during 16 roll calls between May 9 and May 16, 2006, during which they distributed the flyers and books featured at the leadership conference.

The union argued that the employer’s actions, allowing the religious group to make religious presentations during mandatory employee meetings to Sheriff deputies, had the purpose or effect of advancing religion.The union sued the Milwaukee County Sheriff under Section 1983, alleging that the religious meeting violated their rights under the Establishment Clause of the First Amendment.

The Seventh Circuit affirmed the district court and unanimously held:

Because the group’s presentations during mandatory employee gatherings gave, at the least, the appearance of endorsement by the Sheriff’s Department, we conclude that the defendants violated the Establishment Clause . . .

In this case, the Centurions gave a heavily Christian-focused presentation at a mandatory
conference for government employees, and the Sheriff subsequently invited them to present at mandatory roll calls during work hours, granting them unfiltered access to a captive audience of subordinates. At each roll call, they were personally introduced by the Sheriff’s command staff and were permitted to distribute additional Christian-focused literature. Even more telling was the Sheriff’s refusal to cease the presentations after some of the deputies complained of the Centurions’ proselytizing. He took no steps to disentangle himself or the Department from any of the religious message . . . and his actions, at the least, appeared to place the Centurions’ in the same category as the other “partnering” organizations, like Johnson’s Bike Company—all of whom presumably received the Department’s approval.

I agree with the court that, “it would be difficult to interpret the Sheriff’s actions as anything other than endorsement.”

One last point. The court also considered the free speech rights of the religious group to speak to the Deputies under a First Amendment free speech forum analysis.  On this ground, the court concluded:

The Sheriff is mistaken that the department has created a forum of any kind and so, the Centurion’s desire to access the deputies present at the leadership conference and roll calls does not trigger a Free Speech forum analysis.  The Supreme Court recognizes a distinction between claims asserting access to a forum and claims asserting access to a captive audience. Minn. State Bd. for Cmty Coll. v. Knight, 465 U.S. 271, 286 (1984).

In all, this case is a welcome reminder that public places of employment may not purposefully expose their employees to religious proselytizing, no matter how benign the purposes.

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What Is a Lie and Is It Constitutionally Protected?

I think that the three judge panel’s decision to recommend dismissal of ethics charges against Justice Michael Gableman is the right outcome. I doubt that we really want tribunals passing upon the truth and falsity of campaign speech – even for judges.

There were differing approaches taken by the panel judges. Judges Snyder and Deininger found that the Gableman campaign’s ad criticizing Louis Butler for “finding a loophole” for a convicted rapist who went on to offend again was literally true, nohwithstanding that “the loophole” did not result in Butler’s client’s release and he offended again only after serving his sentence.  It was, they believed, a misleading ad but true because each sentence in the ad, taken in isolation, was literally true. Although the Judicial Code also addresses true, but misleading statements, its admonition against such statements is only aspirational and cannot form the basis for discipline.

Judge Fine, on the other hand, wants to take the statement as a whole and that has substantial intuitive appeal.  We don’t, in common discourse,  isolate a message’s individual words, phrases and sentences to discern its meaning.

He goes on, however, to find that the Code’s prohibition on knowingly false statements to be unconstitutional. But that finding  seems itself to be a function of his willingness to apply the language of that Code in a more expansive way. 

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Public Financing of Supreme Court Races: The Legislature Whacks A Mole

Whac-A-MoleIn a forthcoming article in the Harvard Journal of Law & Public Policy, I argue ( the metaphor is not original with me) that campaign finance reform is like a game of Whac-A-Mole™ in which the moles always win.

The state legislature has passed public financing for state Supreme Court elections. I have no problem with public financing in general but this bill is likely to enhance what most people disliked about our recent hotly contested Supreme Court races. Most of the money in the two hotly contested races was spent by independent groups. For a variety of reasons, those ads tend to be negative which, in a judicial race, means calling your opponent “pro-criminal” or displaying photos of he sex predators that he did not send away for a long enough time.

The bill doesn’t restrict independent expenditures (that would be constitutionally difficult) although it does try to counter their impact by providing increased public financing to candidates who face independent expenditures calling for the defeat of that candidate or the election of her opponent when, in the aggregate, those expenditures exceed 120% of the public financing benefit, i.e., $ 300,000 for the general election. These “matching” public funds are capped at three times the public financing benefit, e.g, $900,000 for the general. 

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