The House Judiciary Committee held a markup hearing on the Stop Online Piracy Act, H.R. 3261, the bill that is quickly shaping up to be this year’s big copyright battle. I’ve written two prior posts on the bill, Part I and Part II.

This is a good opportunity to recap where I came out at the end of my last post: SOPA in its then-current form was very troubling. The most troubling part was Section 103, which seemed to have been drafted with two inconsistent goals in mind, as if the co-authors were Dr. Jekyll working alongside Mr. Hyde: on the one hand Section 103 appeared to offer limited supplemental remedies in suits brought under existing copyright and trademark law, and on the other it appeared to significantly modify existing law by creating a free-form cause of action and a notice-and-takedown regime that went far beyond what the DMCA enacted thirteen years ago. For the reasons I stated in the post, I believe that the former reading — the Jekyll version if you will — had to be the correct one, because both the alleged new cause of action and the apparent notice-and-takedown regime were radically under-specified. I’m still concerned that critics of the bill are cementing an overly broad reading of it — the Hyde version — by not even acknowledging the Jekyll reading as a possibility. (This is akin to a concern that copyright scholar Jessica Litman has recently expressed as well, that copyright critics may ironically worsen the doctrines they are concerned about by asserting the most damaging interpretation.)

In addition to all that, SOPA as introduced had an overly broad scope for (what I argue are) the supplemental remedies — they appeared not just to apply to sites infringing in the U.S. but as a practical matter immune to traditional means of enforcement — the so-called foreign “rogue sites” — but to any website, anywhere, even one that a U.S. court would have no problem directly enforcing a preliminary injunction against with contempt sanctions. That is, even if Section 103 were amended to make clear, as I believe it should be, that the remedies involving domain names and ad networks are supplemental means of enforcement, it did not expressly limit itself to situations where there is a need for such extraordinary remedies. I would hope that courts would nevertheless apply such limits anyway, but that might be asking a lot from a court unfamiliar with the policy debates.

In advance of today’s hearing, SOPA’s main sponsor, Rep. Lamar Smith, offered a “manager’s amendment” to the bill making several changes. Does Smith’s amendment fix the above problems? Yes and no.

This is the second post in a series looking at the Stop Online Piracy Act, a House bill that’s been getting a lot of attention lately. In Part I of this series I looked at Section 102 and concluded that it was largely unobjectionable. Section 102 essentially provides the DOJ with supplemental provisional remedies it can use against sites that are violating U.S. criminal laws but are beyond the effective reach of U.S. courts. There may still be valid concerns with Section 102, and I plan to address a couple in a later post, but it doesn’t seem to pose any special danger to the Internet or existing copyright law.

Then there’s Section 103. The idea behind Section 103 appears to be to provide copyright owners in a civil case with similar provisional remedies as in Section 102, following some sort of notice-and-takedown scheme reminiscent of Section 512 of the DMCA. And if all Section 103 targeted was foreign “rogue sites” as well, then there would be much less cause for concern. But Section 103 appears to go well beyond that. In contrast to Section 102, there’s nothing in the definition of the sites targeted under Section 103 — sites “dedicated to theft of U.S. property” — that limits those sites to sites outside the jurisdiction of United States courts. In fact, Section 103 seems weirdly out of place next to the more limited Section 102, and is out of sync with how defenders of the bill are describing it, which is as a narrow provision designed to combat foreign “rogue sites.” Section 103 is weird in a number of ways that suggest that it is the result of a sort of pastiche compromise between a narrow provision targeting rogue sites in civil suits and an all-out amendment of Section 512 of the Copyright Act. There’s two aspects of Section 103 in particular that I find little short of bizarre: (1) it sets up a notice-and-takedown regime that, as far as I can determine, is completely voluntary, but it uses the word “shall” in describing what recipients must do; and (2) it refers to “a cause of action under this section” without ever describing what that cause of action is.