Cobb and Kaltsounis, “Real Collaborative Context”

As I just mentioned, the latest issue of JALWD, which was themed “Legal Writing Beyond Memos and Briefs,” has a number of really interesting articles.  Another one I would recommend reading is Tom Cobb and Sarah Kaltsounis’s “Real Collaborative Context:  Opinion Writing and the Appellate Process.”

I have experimented with collaboration in the classroom in a number of different ways, for a number of reasons.  Most importantly, it seems to me that human beings think better in collaboration.  That’s the case for me, anyway. I am able to think more carefully and critically when I bounce my thoughts off of someone else, preferably more than one person.  Additionally, lawyers collaborate in practice, and students need practice working in those collaborative contexts. (Especially some students.  Come to think of it, so do some lawyers.)

So, anyway, Cobb and Kaltsounis’s article was extremely interesting to me.  I have to agree with their observation at the outset, that despite our best efforts, 

something about the form of collaboration we typically adopt [in the legal writing classroom] has always produced the sense that collaborative learning has failed to achieve some of its most ambitious goals. Part of the problem is that collaboration is often not as engaging as it promises to be. For all it has to offer, the act of splitting into groups and working together in a room with other people who are working in small groups can seem contrived. Small-group work often seems to supplement rather than complement the learning process. When perceived as a contrivance, it can hinder full engagement with a complex legal problem — making the group’s legal analysis seem more like a classroom exercise than a method for learning sophisticated analytical and rhetorical techniques, or for engaging in jurisprudence. Such artificiality is intensified when small-group work is paired, as it ordinarily is in legal writing classes, with a task like memo writing, which is rarely approached in small groups in legal practice. 

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Court Holds That Wikipedia Entries Are “Inherently Unreliable”

On the Legal Writing Prof blog, Jim Levy noted today (hat-tipping BNA Internet Law News) that a court expressly rejected an appellant’s attempt to rely on Wikipedia.

In State v. Flores, an unpublished decision by the Texas Court of Appeals for the 14th District dated October 23, 2008, the court refused the appellant’s request to take judicial notice of a Wikipedia entry describing the “John Reid interrogation technique.”  The court reasoned in footnote 3 that Wikipedia entries are inherently unreliable because they can be written and edited anonymously by anyone.  The court relied on a recent article from the Wall Street Journal entitled Wikipedians Leave Cyberspace, Meet in Egypt, noting that the egalitarian nature of Wikipedia is both “its greatest strength and its greatest weakness.”

The Flores decision is also available on Westlaw and Lexis at, respectively, 2008 WL 4683960 (Tex.App.-Hous (14th Dist.)) and 2008 Tex. App. LEXIS 8010.

Which reminded me of another recent Wikipedia-related entry on that blog, a note about Lee Peoples’ article, “The Citation of Wikipedia in American Judicial Opinions.”

I haven’t read Peoples’ article yet, but I should, because this issue of the reliability of Wikipedia and its citation by courts has been bubbling up lately.  It think this Texas court was exactly right: “Wikipedia entries are inherently unreliable because they can be written and edited anonymously by anyone.”  I will admit that I sometimes read a Wikipedia entry if I want background information about a topic.  I do not think, though, that I would cite an entry as proof of anything in court.  What do you think?

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Should Non-Precedential Opinions Be “Precedential But Overrulable” Opinions?

A post at Legal Theory Blog alerted me to Amy E. Sloan‘s new article, If You Can’t Beat ‘Em, Join ‘Em:  A Pragmatic Approach to Nonprecedential Opinions in the Federal Appellate Courts, 86 Neb. L. Rev. 895 (2008), available on SSRN.  Amy Sloan is an Associate Professor of Law and Co-Director of the Legal Skills program at University of Baltimore School of Law.  She is well known to legal writing professors, and to many law students, as the author of a popular legal research textbook, Basic Legal Research: Tools and Strategies.

Sloan makes an interesting argument, advocating that Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 32.1 be amended to assign non-precedential opinions a sort of “mixed” precedential value, specifically, that “non-precedential opinions [would be] binding unless overruled by a later panel’s precedential opinion.”  She contends that giving non-precedential cases this “‘overrulable’ status” would ensure that the opinions’ precedential weight would “correspond[] to their position within the traditional hierarchy of federal decisional law.”  

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