Landlords Owe More Delinquent Property Taxes than Homeowners in Milwaukee

Each month, the City of Milwaukee posts an updated list of unpaid property taxes. As I write this, the latest data is as of September 5, 2025, and it shows $46,403,939 in total delinquent property tax principal owed across 10,302 properties.1

Of these delinquent taxes, 38% are owed by a residential landlord, 34% by an owner-occupier, and 28% by the owner of a non-residential property. Residential landlords own 44% of the properties which are currently tax delinquent; owner-occupiers own 45%, and non-residential properties make up the last 11%.

Delinquent Property Taxes by Property Type
City of Milwaukee, 5 September 2025
parcelstaxes owedpercent of
parcelstaxes owed
not residential1,129$13,140,74611%28%
owner occupied4,651$15,835,82045%34%
residential landlord4,522$17,427,37344%38%

Landlords often divide their properties between many different LLCs, making it hard to tell how much they really owe. Our website mkepropertyownership.com links individual LLCs (and other owner names) based on shared business addresses. To be sure, the individual LLCs are legally distinct, and it’s often impossible to conclusively prove they share the same beneficial ownership. Still, these connections create useful ownership networks, which are in many cases almost certainly a single distinct landlord.

Here are the ownership networks which owe the most in delinquent property taxes among all residential landlords in the city.

Top 15 Landlord Networks by Delinquent Taxes Owed
in the City of Milwaukee as of 9/5/2025
click ‘details’ to learn more about this networkparcelsowed
HISTORIC GARFIELD APARTMENTS LLC etc Group (details)2$548,008
251 BRADLEY PLACE LLC etc Group (details)48$409,334
RESIDENTIAL PROPERTIES RESOU etc Group (details)69$301,560
FOUNTAINHEAD CONTRACTING LLC etc Group (details)73$239,829
JOHN LUSZ etc Group (details)12$237,449
AYANTADE PROPERTY MANAGEMENT LLC etc Group (details)26$188,952
ASSET SOLUTIONS LLC etc Group (details)36$155,635
KIM M FORD — ROSSLYN FORD FKA Group (details)5$152,266
PERSEPHONE L WARD — PAMELA M WARD — PERSEPHONE L SMYTH Group (details)12$138,667
JIMMIE WILLIAMS etc Group (details)6$127,781
TFG MILWAUKEE III LLC etc Group (details)3$111,473
BILLI JO L SAFFOLD — BILLI JO SAFFOLD — JOHNATHAN SAFFOLD Group (details)3$101,141
ILO CORPORATION — PARIS CROSSLEY Group (details)12$94,651
RS INVESTMENTS I LLC etc Group (details)14$90,782
AKIDA G BERRY (details)1$86,046

These top-owing ownership networks cover a range of landlord types. Some of them own just a handful of apartment buildings (with large and unpaid tax bills). Others owe small tax bills for many single family rentals or duplexes.

For example, the Historic Garfield Apartments LLC etc Group owes $548,008 in unpaid taxes for two large apartment buildings, one at 333 W State and the other at 758 N Broadway.

The 251 Bradley Place LLC Group owes $409,334 across 48 delinquent properties. The ownership structure of this group is opaque, but many of the LLCs list a house owned by the notorious Milwaukee landlord Elijah Rashaed as their principal office. Other properties are connected to a West Palm Beach property also evidently owned by Rashaed.

Ownership of the RESIDENTIAL PROPERTIES RESOU etc Group is more clear. This is the Highgrove Holdings portfolio, originally operating out of Torrance, California. Highgrove took down their website for investors earlier this year, but it is still visible on the Internet Archive. Properties owned by this web of LLCs collectively owe $301,560 in delinquent taxes.

Like Highgrove, the Fountainhead Contracting LLC etc Group also owns many duplexes and single family rentals. Across 73 delinquent properties, Fountainhead owes the city $239,829 in late taxes. (Perhaps it is unsurprising that a company presumably named in reference to Ayn Rand would be reluctant to pay its taxes.) The LLCs in this network are mainly connected to a residential address in Muskego, a Waukesha County suburb.

Footnotes

  1. This total and all other figures discussed in this article are calculated after I removed records from the city’s file if the current owner is the City of Milwaukee or another tax exempt non-profit or if the property no longer contains a record in the latest version of the city’s property database.↩︎
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New Controversies in Wisconsin Administrative Law

Administrative law is enjoying a moment in the sun. Take, for example, the attention recently paid to the subject by the United States Supreme Court, which in a series of opinions (Loper Bright, Corner Post, andJarkesy) marked out a new path forward with respect to important aspects of federal administrative law. This post concerns noteworthy developments in the same field in Wisconsin. At both the federal and state levels, it has become clear that modern administrative law cases often involve disputes over very significant and substantive regulatory power, even when cloaked in what may seem to be procedural minutiae.

in recent years. I explored the topic in a series of writings, beginning in September 2017 with a post titled “The Quiet Revolution in Wisconsin Administrative Law.” My purpose was to point out what I perceived as a significant makeover in longstanding principles of administrative law in the state, shifting power away from agencies and toward courts and the legislature. Eight years have passed since then, and while the ground has certainly shifted, the fundamental questions remain the same, relating to the uneasy balance of power between Wisconsin agencies, the Wisconsin state legislature, and Wisconsin courts.

The Wisconsin Supreme Court has twice acted to counter the trends I noted in the original post, restoring some of the discretion Wisconsin agencies historically enjoyed. First, as I described in a 2021 post, the court decided two cases (both captioned Clean Wisconsin v. Wisconsin Department of Natural Resources (2021 WI 71 and 2021 WI 72wi)) to address the scope of Wis. Stat. § 227.10(2m). That statute provides that no agency may implement any “standard,” “requirement,” or permit condition unless the condition has been “explicitly required or explicitly permitted’ by statute or by rule. The Clean Wisconsin cases turned on a question of statutory interpretation: whether “explicit” means “specific,” in other words, whether under § 227.10(2m) the agency’s contested authority must be spelled out via “literal enumeration or verbatim mention” of the conditions in a statute or rule, or whether the authority must simply be “expressly conferred and clear.”

The court concluded that even when no statute or rule spells out verbatim the agency’s authority to impose certain disputed permit conditions, an agency “may rely upon a grant of authority that is explicit but broad when undertaking agency action.” Such broad grants of authority, the court found, comply with the requirements of § 227.10(2m). For example, statutes conferring on the Wisconsin Department of Natural Resources (WDNR) “general supervision and control over the waters of the state” and all “necessary powers” to protect the waters of the state, provided sufficiently “explicit” authority for WDNR to impose specific conditions related to groundwater monitoring on a permitted well.

Most recently, this summer the Wisconsin Supreme Court issued its opinion in Evers v. Marklein II, striking down the authority to pause, object to, or suspend administrative rules held by the powerful legislative Joint Committee for Review of Administrative Rules (JCRAR). This was another power shift that I discussed in my 2017 post. The basis for the court’s new ruling was a rather technical matter: JCRAR’s authority to block, suspend, and object to administrative rules was tantamount to legislative action, and therefore failed the constitutional requirements of bicameralism (a bill must pass both houses) and presentment (the bill must be provided to the governor for signature). Technical grounds notwithstanding, Evers v. Marklein II appeared to significantly reduce the legislature’s power to check agency action.

But rather than putting things to rest, the ruling touched off a new round of political maneuvering. First, Democratic Governor Tony Evers sought to finalize a set of new administrative rules without first submitting them to the JCRAR, citing the court’s opinion. Republican leaders responded with a plan to order the Legislative Reference Bureau not to publish any rules prior to review by legislative standing committees, arguing that the court’s opinion removing some authority from the JCRAR did not eliminate review of administrative rules by standing committees. The LRB director agreed, telling a media outlet that “If [the Joint Committee on Legislative Organization] so directs, the LRB will not finalize or publish any proposed administrative rules that have not completed standing committee review.” Many of the rules – which concern various aspects of important state policies – remain in limbo for now.

While the debate over the authority of Wisconsin administrative agencies currently pits the Republican legislature against the Democratic executive, there is always the possibility that those positions could be reversed in the future – just as has happened at the federal level, with a Republican-led EPA now seeking to impose the most ambitious deregulatory agenda in history. For that reason alone, this delicate balance of authority should be examined on more than partisan political terms.

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What Might Explain D.C. Grand Juries’ Failures to Indict?

chairs for the jury

I once had the privilege of serving on a federal grand jury in Washington DC. I describe it is as a “privilege” not out of any reflexive paean to the criminal justice system, which has many flaws, and not because I was especially thrilled to have been selected. My service was particularly arduous; we met from 8am to 4pm five days a week, after which I would complete all of my work each day as a full-time law firm associate. And that continued for five weeks straight, leaving me, by the end, completely exhausted. The sense of privilege I felt came not from the system or the process, but from having the experience of serving with a group of fellow citizens from all walks of life who were all dedicated to completing one task: determining if the government had enough evidence to prosecute someone.

Based on that experience, it was with considerable interest that I read news reports that several grand juries in the District of D.C. have recently refused to return indictments in high-profile cases involving protesters. Three successive grand juries, for example, refused to indict protester Sydney Reid on charges of assaulting a federal law enforcement officer, when an FBI agent assisting in blocking Reid from interfering with an arrest suffered cuts or scrapes on her hand. Why did they refuse? Over on the Volokh Conspiracy, Prof. Josh Blackman suggests that while it’s possible DC grand juries “are carefully attuned to the gradation between felonies and misdemeanors,” he offers an apparently more plausible explanation: DC jurors are a bunch of hacks. DC US Attorney Jeanine Pirro has a similar view.

There’s a temptation, famously mocked by film critic Pauline Kael, to think that the things you and your friends care about are the things that everyone cares about. But despite the attention law professors and lawyers generally pay to politics, much of the rest of the US population is far less interested. I would hesitate to assume that the average grand juror in DC, or LA or Oklahoma City or anywhere else is as steeped in partisan politics as your average social media poster, or law school denizen, or avid consumer of news.

I don’t know what happened in these three grand juries, or in the others that have refused to indict protesters in DC and LA. I did see firsthand however that it is really hard for a requested indictment to fail. There were jurors on my grand jury that were more skeptical of the police, and there was at least one juror who had qualms about the over-criminalization of drug possession. Some defendants were more sympathetic than others. But the few “no” votes on an indictment almost never came anywhere near the 12 necessary to refuse to return a true bill. If the government had evidence on each element, we voted to indict.

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