SCOTUS to Decide on Padilla Retroactivity

Earlier today, the Supreme Court granted cert. in Chaidez v. United States, 655 F.3d 684 (7th Cir. 2011). Chaidez held that the Court’s decision in Padilla v. Kentucky, 130 S. Ct. 1473 (2010), would not be applied retroactively to defendants whose convictions were already final when Padilla came out. In Padilla, the Court held that a lawyer performs below minimal constitutional standards when he or she fails to advise a client of the deportation risks of a guilty plea. Now, the Court itself will have an opportunity to determine whether its decision should have retroactive effect.

The majority and dissenting judges in Chaidez all agreed that the case turned on whether Padilla announced a new rule of criminal procedure, within the meaning of Teague v. Lane, 489 U.S. 288 (1989). With only a couple of execeptions not relevant here, Teague prohibits retroactivity for new rules. So, the question in Chaidez seems to boil down to whether Padilla announced a new rule or merely applied the basic ineffective assistance test of Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984).

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Equal Justice and the Poor

Many years ago, I attended my first meeting as a newly-elected representative on our church’s parish council. I was enthused, energized. Then an older man, a veteran of the council, pulled me aside before the meeting started and gave me a warning. “Now you’re going to have your eyes opened, ” he said. “It’s a lot easier when you don’t know about all of the issues.” And, of course, he was right.

I had the same experience some time later when I became involved in the most pressing problem facing our legal system: the inability of poor people to afford legal representation for the important life-changing issues they face. I had been involved in pro bono from the day I was graduated from Marquette, handling divorces, landlord-tenant issues, even a capital punishment case in Texas. I enjoyed the rewarding nature of the work and appreciated the hands-on experience. The clients I represented seemed to appreciate having a lawyer.

But while I was helping individuals now and then, and feeling comfortable that I was doing some good, I was blissfully ignorant of the big picture issues and challenges that had the system in a chokehold — the lack of funding for legal service providers, the reluctance of lawyers to become involved in pro bono, the resistance of some to changes in the delivery of legal services to poor people, the lack of leadership from those in the best position to lead. My eyes were anything but open.

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Some Modest Predictions on the Severability of the Individual Mandate

The Court’s decision on the severability of the individual mandate may be the aspect of the PPACA litigation that is most difficult to predict. If the Court holds that the individual mandate is constitutional, then severability won’t be an issue in the first place. If severability does arise, whether and how the Court will sever the mandate is unclear. In part, this is because of problems with severability doctrine itself. Notwithstanding over a century of cases on the issue, the Court has had a hard time settling upon a definitive severability test. Sometimes the emphasis has been on legislative intent. Other times the focus has been on whether the constitutional remainder can function without the invalid part. Still other times the Court has severed or refused to sever without acknowledging the doctrine at all. The oral argument on severability reflected this state of affairs, as the Justices spent a considerable amount of time exploring the merits of several possible tests. Without knowing the doctrine, it is difficult to anticipate a result.

In part, the unpredictability also reflects the absence of a completely satisfying way to sever the mandate if it is unconstitutional. Because the PPACA lacks a severability clause, covers such a diversity of topics, and reflects a variety of legislative compromises, it is hard to identify a clear legislative intent with respect to severability. Because the invalidation of the mandate will render certain aspects of the core health-care reforms financially problematic, it is unsatisfying to focus exclusively on the textual separability of the mandate from surrounding provisions. And because courts are poorly equipped to appreciate the complexities of health care policy, it seems problematic to base severability on anticipated financial implications.

That being said, I think we can reasonably make a couple of predictions about this aspect of the decision. First, if the Court holds that the individual mandate is not severable, that holding will rest on the votes of the conservative Justices, who generally seemed much more skeptical of severability than their counterparts during oral argument.

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