Miller’s Unanswered Questions and the Future of the Eighth Amendment

Since it was handed down late last month, the Supreme Court’s decision in Miller v. Alabama has deservedly received much attention from lawyers and nonlawyers alike.  The Court held, on Eighth Amendment grounds, that juveniles may not be sentenced to mandatory terms of life imprisonment without parole; “JLWOP” can only be imposed by a judge who has discretion to consider the juvenile’s “youth and attendant circumstances.”  (20)  Miller thus nicely complements the Court’s 2010 decision in Graham v. Florida, in which the Court banned JLWOP for all offenses less severe than homicide.  In Miller, the Court preserved JLWOP as a sentencing option in homicide cases, but only if certain procedural requirements are satisfied, that is, only if the sentencing judge considers “youth and attendant circumstances.”

Like Graham, Miller breaks down a doctrinal barrier between capital punishment and the lesser sentence of life without parole.  In Graham, for the first time in a noncapital case, the Court used the methodology it had developed for determining whether the death penalty could be applied to particular categories of offenders, such as juveniles and the mentally retarded.  Before Graham, it seemed as if there were no meaningful substantive limitations on noncapital sentences.  Similarly, before Miller, there was a well-developed body of Eighth Amendment doctrine regarding the sentencing procedures that had to be followed in capital cases, but no corresponding doctrine for noncapital cases.  Miller suggests that the procedural rules may now be migrating, along with the substantive limitations, into LWOP cases and perhaps beyond.

Graham and Miller may lay the foundation for a revolution in the constitutional law of sentencing.  Or maybe not.  It’s too early to say for sure.  Perhaps this Court just has a soft spot for kids (see, for instance, last term’s decision in J.D.B. v. North Carolina.)

In any event, as the revolution or non-revolution plays out, we are likely to see the courts wrestling with many interesting questions raised by Miller.  I’ll highlight a few in the remainder of this post.

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State v. Stevens: Reaffirming Blum on No Precedential Value of Overruled Court of Appeals Cases – With a Caveat

Precedent and authority are concepts with which students become familiar early in law school and grow to appreciate even more in practice. Law students learn to look to details such as jurisdiction, court hierarchy, status of a decision as published or unpublished, dates of decisions, and subsequent treatment and build on these foundations to evaluate precedential value and weight of authority. Students and legal researchers in Wisconsin had to rethink some of what had been considered established principles regarding precedent after the Wisconsin Supreme Court announced in Blum that court of appeals decisions that it overruled retained no precedential value absent an express statement that portions of a decision were left intact. Today, the court in State v. Stevens reaffirmed the holding in Blum, but did so with the caveat that courts may have to determine whether an opinion was really intended to overrule all of a decision or only a portion thereof when applying the rule retroactively.

In Blum v. 1st Auto Casualty & Insurance Co., 2010 WI 78, 326 Wis. 2d 729, 786 N.W.2d 78, a decision issued two years ago tomorrow, the Wisconsin Supreme Court held “that when the supreme court overrules a court of appeals decision, the court of appeals decision no longer possesses any precedential value, unless this court expressly states otherwise.”¶ 42. The court discussed several public policy and practical considerations that it deemed would be served by this “bright-line rule nullifying the precedential value of an overruled court of appeals decision.” ¶ 51. The court viewed the rule as one that would help eliminate confusion that had grown regarding precedential value of reversed and overruled opinions and that “clarifies the law for the public as a whole.” ¶ 55.

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And the Princess Lived Happily Ever After as a Lawyer

I just finished reading Cinderella Ate My Daughter: Dispatches from the Front Lines of the New Girlie-Girl Culture.

As clichéd as it sounds, children’s things just seem different from when I was growing up. Toys, tennis rackets, toothbrushes, everything, it seems, can be purchased in girl or boy specific colors and styles today.

The premise of the book validated my observations. Children are at the center of a huge marketing scheme aimed at getting parents to buy more. How is it done?

The author, Peggy Orenstein, explains that segmenting the children’s market causes people to think they should purchase separately at each level of a child’s development, or for each gender. The concept of “the toddler” is an example. Orenstein “assumed that phase was something experts—people with PhDs at the very least—developed after years of research into children’s behavior.”  (36)  Her assumption was wrong.

Instead, it “[t]urns out, according to Daniel Cook, a historian of childhood consumerism, it was popularized as a marketing gimmick by clothing manufacturers in the 1930s.” (36)

And, what’s more, “[i]t was only after ‘toddler’ became common shoppers’ parlance that it evolved into a broadly accepted developmental stage.” (36) 

Enter the princess market. The princess market was developed by a savvy strategist at Disney named Andy Mooney in 2000.

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