Running Away from History in Trump v. Slaughter

[This piece is cross-posted and was originally published in the Yale J. on Reg.: Notice & Comment blog.] On December 8, 2026, the Supreme Court will hear oral argument in the landmark case of Trump v. Slaughter. A fundamental issue in the case is whether the statutorily created office of Commissioner for the FTC can include partial restrictions on the President’s ability to remove a Commissioner. The government contends that the statutory removal restrictions impinge on an indefeasible Presidential removal power under Article II.  

While the Supreme Court’s recent decisions in Seila Law and Collins have recognized an indefeasible Presidential removal power for some officers, a flood of recent research has undermined historical arguments for a categorical rule that would extend removal at pleasure to all officers or all principal officers. For summaries of this historical literature see Chabot, Katz, Rosenblum & Manners, Nelson, Katz & Gienapp. (My latest paper, The Interstitial Executive: A View from the Founding, adds more fuel to the fire: it introduces a critical body of previously overlooked archival evidence to show that the Washington, Adams, and Jefferson administrations routinely complied with statutory removal restrictions in their officer commissions.)

The government’s reply brief banked on recent precedent from the Roberts Court. It leaned into Seila Law and the unitary understanding of the Decision of 1789 that the Court adopted in that case.  At the same time, the government offered an extension of Seila Law that would create further conflicts with the historical record.

Both Seila Law and the officers created pursuant to the Decision of 1789 involved departments led by single officers. Neither Seila Law nor the Decision of 1789 involved statutory tenure protections for officers serving on multimember commissions such as the Federal Reserve or the FTC. As a result, Seila Law is not necessarily at odds with historical evidence supporting these independent multimember commissions.  Some of the strongest Founding era examples of tenure-protected officers were those serving on multimember commissions such as the Sinking Fund Commission (described in my work here and here) and the Revolutionary War Debt Commission (described in recent work by Victoria Nourse as well as my new paper).  

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Quick Reactions to the Cox v. Sony Music Oral Argument

The Cox v. Sony Music Entertainment argument just ended as I started this; here are my immediate takeaways. (For more detail on the case, see my blog series over the weekend: Part 1 on the contributory infringement test, Part 2 on the confusion about the required mental state after Grokster, and Part 3 on the connections between contributory copyright infringement doctrine and the common law.)

It’s almost always difficult to predict a result, or even votes, based on the oral argument, and I haven’t even had the opportunity to read the transcript yet. But here’s a few things that stood out to me:

1. Much of the argument focused on the required state of mind for liability. There was basically no appetite from anyone for adopting the Restatement/Gershwin standard of knowledge of the wrongdoing. Cox, represented by Joshua Rosenkranz, and the Solicitor General’s office, represented by Malcolm Stewart, argued that contributory liability requires a showing that the defendant shared the same purpose as the direct infringer, and wanted to accomplish the same goal — a standard drawn from the many criminal aiding and abetting cases cited in Twitter. A number of questions from the justices seemed to support this idea, leading Justice Gorsuch at one point to conclude, perhaps optimistically, that a consensus view had emerged on that. In response, Paul Clement, representing the music companies, argued that intent was the correct standard, defining intent as including, under Restatement 2d of Torts sec. 8A, substantial certainty that harm to the plaintiff will result from one’s actions.

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Behind Their Public Duties: Two City Officials Tell Compelling Personal Stories at Lubar Center Programs

Sometimes, the personal stories of public officials can be self-serving and just plain not interesting. But sometimes they can be insightful and compelling, saying important things about the individuals, the work they do, and life more broadly.

Two recent “Get to Know” programs at Marquette Law School, hosted by Derek Mosley, director of the Lubar Center for Public Policy Research and Civic Education, were definitely in the latter category.  Each spotlighted a person who holds an important job. But the biography of each – and their life stories are very different — says a lot about the character of Milwaukee and the challenges the city faces.

Aaron Lipski, chief of the Milwaukee Fire Department, spoke with Mosley on Oct. 9, 2025. He has been in the news often in recent times, including for his strong advocacy of putting sprinklers in older apartment buildings in the light of fatal fires and for his call for the Milwaukee city budget to sharply increase spending on new trucks and equipment for the fire department.

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