Trump is more popular than many of his policies

Many Americans love Donald Trump and even more hate him, but neither of these groups is large enough to win an election by themselves. Except when turnout is low, American elections for the past 9 years have turned with the preferences of those voters whose views of Trump are mixed.

In order to better understand these voters, the Marquette Law School Poll regularly invites a representative sample of American adults to answer the following two simple questions. What do you like about Donald Trump? What do you dislike about him? Respondents can write as much or as little as they want.

The answers to these questions, when paired with traditional multiple-choice items, show a large chunk of the electorate whose attitudes toward the president and broad policy issues, like immigration or trans rights, are malleable. These (potential) voters often hold combinations of views that are rarely found among politicians, making their support for any candidate contingent on issue salience, framing, and whatever ineffable quality makes some candidates seem more trustworthy than the rest.

Our latest poll was in the field in late March, preceding Trump’s “Liberation Day” tariff announcement. Previous installments were fielded a few weeks before and about a month after the inauguration.

At a high level, views of Trump changed little throughout the first three months of his presidency. Shortly before his inauguration, 49% of adults in our polling had a favorable opinion of him. That stood at 44% at the beginning of February and 46% in late March–all changes within the margin of error.

The overall patterns in the open-ended answers haven’t changed much either. In the latest poll, 50% of adults listed something they both like and disliked about Trump. 11% couldn’t name anything they disliked, and 36% couldn’t name anything they liked.

Summary of open-ended survey responses
in the Marquette Law School Poll, national adult sample
Attitude toward Donald Trumpsurvey dates
12/2-11/241/27-2/6/253/17-27/25
Can name likes and dislikes51%47%50%
Doesn’t dislike anything12%14%11%
Doesn’t like anything35%36%36%
no answer2%3%2%

This stability in overall attitude toward Trump doesn’t surprise me. After all, he has been at the center of American politics since his first primary campaign began a decade ago. Few voters lack an opinion of him and much of his behavior is already “priced in.”

But even though attitudes toward Trump himself are fairly stable, if trending a bit downward, opinions toward Trump’s favored policies are all over the place.

In our latest poll, we asked about 10 topics related to Trump’s agenda or recent Supreme Court decisions. The graph below shows the responses to each.

The most popular position across all of these questions was support for the 2020 Supreme Court ruling prohibiting workplace discrimination against “gay and transgender workers.” Eight-two percent of adults agreed with extending federal civil rights law to these workers.

At the same time, 72% of adults hope the Supreme Court upholds a Tennessee law prohibiting “medical providers from prescribing puberty-delaying medication or performing gender transition surgery for youth under 18.”

A large majority, 68%, support the deportation of undocumented immigrants when asked “Do you favor or oppose deporting immigrants who are living in the United States illegally back to their home countries?” When the wording is changed to include, “even if they have lived here for a number of years, have jobs and no criminal record?” support falls to 41% and opposition rises to 59%.

A decisive share of voters are not consistently “pro” or “anti” trans rights or deportation. Rather, their answers depend on the specific facts included in each question.

graph showing support and opposition for various policies

For each of the above questions, I coded a respondent as “1” if they supported the Trump/conservative position, “-1” if they chose the Democratic/liberal position, and “0” if they declined to take a side. A respondent receives a score of -10 if they took every liberal position and +10 if they always took the conservative side. The graph below shows the distribution of scores for all adults.

Few respondents fell into the most liberal or conservative categories. Forty-two percent are in the most liberal third and 31% are in the most conservative third of possible scores. Twenty-six percent of adults fell in the middle, with scores reflecting a mixture of support for conservative or liberal policies.

It is the open-ended answers from this last group that give insight into the views and beliefs of the most persuadable section of the electorate.

net ideological score of support and opposition for various policies

Click here to access our tool for viewing randomized responses to our open-ended questions. The tool allows you to filter responses by the respondent’s degree of support or opposition to Trump’s policies.

screenshot of interactive tool
Continue ReadingTrump is more popular than many of his policies

The Partisan Implications of ‘Low Turnout’ Have Flipped in Wisconsin

There’s a growing conventional wisdom that the two parties have flipped in their relationship to voter turnout. Now, it seems, Democrats are strongest in lower-turnout elections and Republicans do best when turnout is highest.

This is a real paradigm shift from not too long ago. During the Obama years, Democrats enjoyed a clear majority among potential voters broadly defined, but this majority depended on the adults least likely to participate. Republicans, on the other hand, had great strength with the most regular voters. For this reason, Obama could handily win Wisconsin (and the nation) in 2008 and 2012, but the Republican Tea Party wave dominated in 2010.

Here are a few more interesting data points in support of that emerging conventional wisdom.

Turnout always drops from a presidential election to the following gubernatorial election two years later, but the size of the decline varies from place to place. I was curious: does the decline in voter turnout correlate with changes in vote margin?

To answer this, I ran a regression comparing each municipality’s change in voter turnout with the change in vote margin between elections for president and governor.

The results are striking. In 2002, 2006, and 2010, a 1% decline in voter turnout from the previous presidential election predicted a more than 0.1 increase in the Republican vote margin for governor. This advantage dwindled in 2014 and reversed in 2018 and 2022.

In both of Tony Evers’ elections, a 1% decline in voter turnout predicted a significant increase in support for Evers, relative to Trump in the same municipality two years earlier.

graph showing the influence of a 1% decline in voter turnout from the previous presidential election on gubernatorial vote margins

The same dynamic affects Supreme Court races. The people most likely to show up in an April nonpartisan election are older, highly educated, and more wealthy. These demographics used to lean Republican; now they lean Democratic.

In April 2025, the liberal candidate Susan Crawford won 55% of the vote to conservative Brad Schimel’s 45%. Recall that in November 2024, Trump received 50% of the vote to Harris’ 49% in Wisconsin.

All the evidence I’ve seen shows that Crawford’s improvement over Harris is mostly due to who showed up. A survey from Blueprint Research found that 52% of voters in April 2025 had voted for Harris the previous November, and 46% had voted for Trump. Likewise, the researchers at Split Ticket analyzed ward-level election results and concluded, “roughly 70% of Susan Crawford’s win margin was attributable to changes in who was voting, rather than changes in how people voted.”

Here’s an example of all these trends taken from my hometown, the City of Milwaukee.

This graph shows that in the early 2000s, Democrats did best in presidential elections, a little worse in gubernatorial elections, and much worse in elections for Wisconsin Supreme Court.

In 2002, the Democratic candidate for governor won Milwaukee by 39 points, and in 2004 the Democratic presidential candidate won it by 44. Right in between those two elections, in 2003, the conservative candidate for Wisconsin Supreme Court outright won the City of Milwaukee by 5 points.

line graph showing margins among city of Milwaukee voters in races for president, governor, and WI supreme court

Since the early 2000s, things have changed. Democratic presidential margins in the city topped out at 60 points in 2012. Since then, they’ve dwindled slightly. Democratic candidates for governor have just kept climbing. Evers’ margin in 2018 matched Clinton’s share in 2016. But Evers’ Milwaukee margin of victory in 2022 reached heights not even achieved by Barack Obama.

The increase in support for liberal supreme court candidates among Milwaukee voters has been even more spectacular. Liberal candidates were consistently winning the City of Milwaukee by the 2010s, but in 2016, the liberal candidate still trailed Hillary Clinton by 34 points. In 2020, the liberal Court candidate trailed Biden by just 7 points among Milwaukee voters. In 2025, the liberal judicial candidate’s margin of victory exceeded Harris’ 2024 margin by 11 points.

Something fundamental changed in the years following Trump’s first election. Now, the smaller the electorate in Milwaukee, the more liberal it seems to be.

Continue ReadingThe Partisan Implications of ‘Low Turnout’ Have Flipped in Wisconsin

The prohibitive cost of new construction in Milwaukee

Four single-family homes on the 2000 block of W Vliet St

The photo above shows four of Milwaukee’s newest houses. They were built in 2024 in the Midtown neighborhood by the large affordable housing developer Gorman and Co.  Gorman’s goal for the project was to “serve as a proof of concept that market-rate, owner-occupied hous[ing] can work in the area,” according to reporting by Urban Milwaukee.

Instead, it looks like the original developers will lose their shirts on this project—yet another example of how impractical market rate construction remains in most of Milwaukee.

Back in 2021, Gorman expected the houses to cost around $250,000 to build, with sale prices somewhere under $200,000. To make up the difference, the city created a TIF district contributing $75,000 per home, funded by future property taxes from these new homes.

The market changed dramatically in the early 2020s with construction inflation far outstripping the consumer price index. Those “250k” houses wound up costing “approximately $400,000 to build” according to a Gorman official speaking near the project’s competition in August 2024.

Reflecting the 60% increase in costs, the houses originally went on the market at listings of $359,900 and $369,900 (for the two different floor plans). 324 days after the initial listing, the first home finally sold on April 4, 2025. The closing price: $281,000, 24% less than the initial asking price, which was itself below the reported development cost.

How much does new construction really cost?

It can be tough to find detailed, current, and public information about construction prices. Recently, I acquired the applications for all 47 proposed developments applying for affordable housing tax credits in Minnesota during 2024. These applications include a detailed development budget with dozens of line items for specific costs. I’ve requested the same information from Wisconsin but have not received it. Some legal fees likely vary between the states, but I expect development costs to be basically similar between Minnesota and Wisconsin.

This table shows a simple cost breakdown across all the projects. I’ve removed acquisition costs from these calculations, because many affordable housing projects get the land for free. Leaving aside any land costs, the median housing unit cost $414k to build. Of that cost 75% went to the construction budget, 10% to the developer, 7% in professional fees (architect, permitting, legal, etc.), and 6% to financing costs (insurance, interest, etc.).

table showing the median budgeted development costs of 47 projects applying for affordable housing tax credits in Minnesota in 2024

The next graph shows the per-unit total cost vs. the number of units in the development for each project. There is a wide range in costs per project, but generally, larger projects are cheaper. Projects with 50 or more units had a median per unit price of $389,000, compared with $454,000 for those with fewer than 50 units.

The absolute cheapest proposed development was a 65-unit senior-housing apartment building with a per-unit cost of $300,000. Any family-sized housing development inevitably cost more.

How do total construction prices translate to monthly rents? Imagine if you had to pay off a $300,000 unit at a fixed 6% interest rate over 30 years. The principal, interest, and taxes alone would be $2,415 a month. For the median $414,000 unit, the bare minimum PITI and tax payment would be $3,333. In reality, costs are even higher. Occupancy is always less than 100% and apartment developers must budget for repairs, maintenance, and insurance.

scatterplot showing the per unit development cost vs the number of units in each project

Where can the market afford to build new housing in Milwaukee?

This is one of the most underappreciated facts about housing in cities like Milwaukee. We don’t build housing because, in many (if not most) places, you cannot sell a new house for what it costs to build it. And without significant subsidizes, you cannot charge the rents required to finance the construction of a market-rate apartment building.

Let’s take $350,000 as the bare minimum price required to build a standard detached, single-family home. Citywide, just 7% of houses are worth this much.[i] This improves to 43% among houses built since 2000. Still, most ‘modern’ houses in the city are not worth what it would cost to replace them.

This simple fact, in most neighborhoods houses cost more to build than you can sell them for, explains why the city has so many empty lots. In total, I count 1,500 non-tax-exempt empty lots where you could build a house right now under existing land use rules.[ii] 38% of those lots allow single family development under the existing rules, 44% duplexes or triplexes, and 17% quadplexes or more. The quadplex-eligible empty lots are overwhelmingly in the poorest areas of the city. I count 150 lots in just the 6th and 15th aldermanic districts which a private developer could buy right now and build a quadplex on by-right.

map showing the locations of taxable vacant lots colored by max zoned density

This is the basic conundrum: vacant parcels are common in neighborhoods where prevailing values are far below the level needed to finance new construction. Where home values are high enough to finance new construction, buildable lots are scarce. While it’s possible that developers could tear down existing houses to build new ones, this is practically unheard of in Milwaukee, even in neighborhoods where denser development is already legal.

For example, there are over 3,500 single family homes which could be replaced with a quadplex under existing zoning and lot size rules. But I cannot find a single instance of a quadplex replacing a single family home in my parcel records going back to 1990.

Accessory Dwelling Units

For these reasons, I’m most optimistic about accessory dwelling units as a way to add housing units in Milwaukee. They are cheaper to build and can fit in those neighborhoods of the city where property values are highest.

Also, ADUs are nothing new for Milwaukee. I count about 1,200 city lots classified as a “single family” or “duplex” but which hold multiple residentially buildings. Sometimes called “carriage houses,” they are almost entirely in the older neighborhoods surrounding downtown.

According to this 2025 analysis by Angi, the home contractor marketplace, the typical ADU costs $180,000 to build, with prices ranging between $40,000-$360,000. Costs are cheaper for internal basement or garage conversions and higher for new construction.

I wanted to know how many homeowners in Milwaukee might be able to afford costs in this range, so I modeled the home equity of every local homeowner as of January 2025.[iii] Citywide, the median homeowner has accrued $128,000 in home equity. 66% have at least $100,000 and 26% have $180,000 or more. In total, I estimate 18,000 Milwaukee households have enough home equity to finance the average cost of an ADU.

How many would actually do it? I don’t know. In Seattle, where ADUs are far more expensive, they still permit close to 1,000 a year. Right now, in Milwaukee, we’re averaging fewer than 50 new single family homes or duplexes across the entire city in a typical year. We lose about the same number of units to conversions of duplexes into single family homes. Even a small number of people choosing to build ADUs would be a meaningful change from the status quo.


[i] I’m using the 2024 assessed value and adjusting it by the Wisconsin Department of Revenue’s 0.9024 equalized assessed value ratio for the City of Milwaukee.

[ii] I calculate this based on the lot’s current zoning classification and its lot size. Some lots may have idiosyncratic dimensions which further reduce the allowable density.

[iii] I have data on the purchase date and price of every owner-occupied house in the city. To calculate accrued equity, I subtract the owner’s modeled remaining principal from the 2024 equalized assessed value of the property. I model remaining principal by assuming that the owner paid 5% down, received a 30-year fixed-rate mortgage at prevailing interest rates, and has stayed current on their payments without refinancing. Obviously, individual circumstances will vary from the average predicted by the model.

Continue ReadingThe prohibitive cost of new construction in Milwaukee