Religious Objections to Autopsies—A Virtual Solution?

“[I]n this world,” wrote Benjamin Franklin famously, “nothing can be said to be certain, except death and taxes.” Were we to add a third certainty to the list, it might be that law will have something to say about the other two. To be sure, the law has quite a bit to say about death, including a mandate, under certain circumstances, to determine the cause of one’s demise.

Often such determinations entail autopsies or postmortem examinations, but sometimes these examinations are offensive to the decedent’s religious beliefs or to those of surviving family members. In such situations, it has frequently been the case that the religious beliefs have had to yield to the interests of the government or the public.

A few years ago, Kelly McAndrews (MU Law 2010) and I gave a presentation on religious objections to autopsies at a conference of the Wisconsin Coroners and Medical Examiners Association. (At the time, Kelly was the Medical Examiner for Washington County, Wisconsin.) We noted that, among other groups in Wisconsin, the Hmong and Orthodox Jews would likely have strong objections to autopsies, while that the Old Order Amish, Hindus, and some Muslims, American Indians, and Christian Scientists may have objections ranging from minor to moderate in their intensity.

Potential bases for objection, varying by religion, include: concerns about delay in the preparation and burial of the body as prescribed by religious law or tradition; concerns about the mutilation, desecration, or disturbance of the body (e.g., the body belongs to God and should not be altered, the body is needed intact for successful passage to the afterlife, or the body is needed intact in the afterlife itself); and concerns about spiritual harm to the surviving relatives for failing to take care of the decedent in a religiously proper manner.

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Inherently Subversive Pedagogy

In 2010 the Arizona legislature created a law designed to deter the teaching of a Mexican American Studies course in Tucson schools by cutting State funding to districts with courses that, among other things, “promote resentment toward a race or class of people.”  After a finding by the state court in 2011 and under the threat of a $15 million fine, the Tucson district was forced to stop utilizing a course that was available to all students, was effectively closing the achievement gap, and was successful in helping Latino students attend college.  One aspect of enforcement that the district decided on was banning the use of many books that were a part of the Mexican American Studies program from schools.

I was introduced to the Tucson curriculum issue in Professor Mazzie’s first semester Legal Analysis, Research, and Writing 1 class last fall.  Our assignment was to write a brief memo on whether the Tucson course was in violation of A.R.S. § 15-112.  The constitutionality of the Arizona law itself has since been called into question under the purview of a federally appointed special master who is overseeing the Tucson School District’s mandated desegregation.  It was satisfying to see, earlier this month, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit agree with my position in Professor Mazzie’s class that the curriculum was not necessarily a per se violation of A.R.S. § 15-112 anyway.

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Legal Anomalies in Federal Indian Law, Part I—Equal Protection

Federal Indian Law—the legal provisions and doctrines governing the respective statuses of, and relations among, the federal, state, and tribal governments—is replete with seeming anomalies when compared to the background of typical domestic law in the United States. Such anomalies or aberrations, though frequently noted, have seldom if ever been systematically delineated in cases or in legal scholarship. The purpose of this and succeeding blog posts is to identify and examine several of these anomalies, the hope being that readers will gain a better sense of the unique topography of Federal Indian Law and at least some of the reasons that have brought it about.

Examined in this first post will be one such apparent anomaly, namely, the permissibility of the government’s differential treatment of Indian tribes and their members despite the U.S. Constitution’s guarantee of equal protection. This issue goes to the heart of Federal Indian Law, which is largely embodied as statutes in Title 25 of the U.S. Code (denominated “Indians”) and implemented through rules and regulations in Title 25 of the Code of Federal Regulations (also denominated “Indians”). To the extent that the classification of “Indian” ordinarily if not always includes a component of race, ethnicity, ancestry, or perhaps national origin, its use in the federal Code and Regulations—including its derivative use in judicial opinions—would seem presumptively to run afoul of constitutional as well as statutory proscriptions against discrimination on the basis of race, ethnicity, ancestry, and the like. After all, were one to encounter a Title of the U.S. Code designated “African Americans” or “Latinos” or “Germans,” an eyebrow, if not two, would almost certainly be raised in response.

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