More on Marquette Football

In a comment to my earlier post marking the 52nd anniversary of Marquette’s final varsity football game, Nick Zales asked why Marquette decided to terminate its 78-year-old football program in 1960.

The explanation given at the time was that a competitive football team was too expensive for Marquette to maintain in light of the university’s plans for further expansion. (Plans for a 10-year, $30 million fund-raising campaign to pay for additional campus improvements, higher faculty salaries, and more student financial aid had just been announced.)

In revealing the plan to shut down the football and track-and-field programs at the end of the 1960-61 academic year, President O’Donnell stated that the University Athletic Board had, at his request, voted to terminate the two sports because of the university’s “reasonable unwillingness to accept the financial hardships imposed by these two sports in light of the other needs of the university.” The football team had reportedly lost $50,000 over the course of the fall 1960 season and had run at a deficit for several years.

From the perspective of more than a half century, it is hard to evaluate the wisdom of O’Donnell’s decision. The decision to end football was certainly unpopular with students, alumni, and Marquette fans at the time. Shortly after the announcement, an estimated 3000 students marched from the campus through downtown Milwaukee chanting, “We want football. We want justice.”

At the same time, an alumni group, led by Milwaukee businessman Johnny Sisk, pledged to raise the money necessary to pay off the athletic department’s deficit and collected $15,000 the first week. (Sisk had starred for Marquette in the 1930’s before moving on to a five-year career as a halfback for the Chicago Bears. He also had a son on the current Marquette team.)

Although the effort to reverse President O’Donnell’s decision received coverage in the New York Times and other national media outlets, the efforts were to no avail, and football did not return to Marquette.

But was it really necessary to terminate the Marquette football program in 1960?

While it was true that the Marquette football team had done poorly in the mid to late 1950’s—a combined won-lost record of 13-50-3 from 1954 to 1960—the program’s prospects were clearly looking up after the 1960 season. Although the 1960 team had finished with a mediocre 3-6-0 record, the season had started on a strong note at 3-1-0 before Marquette’s fortunes were derailed by injuries. Attendance at Marquette games was up in 1960, and the team had secured permission to play home games in Milwaukee County Stadium, the home of the Braves and Packers (when they played in Milwaukee).

Furthermore, there was every reason to think that the Marquette football team would be much better (and draw in greater revenues) in 1961. In spite of its so-so record, the 1960 team was actually laden with talent; only two starters (both interior linemen) from 1960 were graduating; and the team’s two top stars, halfback David Thiesen and end George Andrie, were among those returning.

Even though Marquette dropped football after the 1960 season, four members of the 1960 team—Andrie, end Pete Hall, and halfbacks Karl Kassulke and John Sisk, Jr.—went on to play in the NFL. Moreover, the fact that fullback Frank Mestnik had moved from the 1959 Marquette team to a starting position with the NFL’s St. Louis Cardinals in 1960 was proof that Marquette could still recruit from the ranks of the top college players.

Furthermore, 1960 was an unusual time for a college, especially the largest Catholic university in the United States, to drop football. From the onset of the Great Depression through the early 1950’s, a significant number of American colleges and universities discontinued their “big-time” football programs because of financial concerns. Most of the colleges that did so were Roman Catholic schools.

Twenty Catholic colleges dropped “big time” football between 1930 and 1954. Including Loyola of Chicago (1930); Loyola of Baltimore (1933); St. Francis of New York (1935); DePaul (c.1938); St. Joseph’s (1939); Gonzaga and Providence (1941); Creighton and Manhattan (1942); St. Francis of Pennsylvania (1946); St. Louis and Portland (1949); Duquesne, Georgetown, Mt. Saint Mary’s, and Niagara (1950); Loyola of Los Angeles and St. Bonaventure (1951); San Francisco (1952); and Fordham (1954).

Several of these schools, especially Fordham and San Francisco, had once been ranked among the top football programs in the United States. (The year in parentheses is the last year the school competed in football, and not necessarily the year in which the decision to eliminate the program was made.)

(Until 1956, the NCAA did not classify its members into divisions, so the category of schools playing “big-time” football was somewhat subjective. After 1956, the NCAA was divided into University and College divisions, which then defined the line between “big-time” and “small college” football. The use of three classifications—Divisions I, II, and III—began in 1973.)

However, relatively few colleges dropped big-time football after 1954. In fact, between 1954 and 1972, only two Catholic colleges gave up football—Marquette and the University of Detroit (1964). Marquette and Detroit (now Detroit Mercy) had played each other for decades, and it is likely that had Marquette not dropped football, Detroit would not have either. (The University of Scranton also dropped football in 1960, but at that time, Scranton played in the “small college” division of the NCAA.)

While 20 Catholic schools did drop football before 1954, there were many others that continued to play football in the NCAA’s highest division after Marquette dropped the sport in 1960. That list obviously includes Notre Dame and Boston College, but it also contains Canisius, Fairfield, Holy Cross, Iona, LaSalle, St. John’s (NY), St. Mary’s (CA), Santa Clara, Seton Hall, Siena, Villanova, and Xavier (OH). There is no particular reason to think that such schools were better able to support football in the 1960’s than Marquette.

While it is true that many of the schools on the previous list eventually did drop their football programs, those decisions came years later. Moreover, none of the schools that subsequently dropped football were as large as Marquette in 1960, and none had such a rich football tradition. None had ever played in a major bowl game, as Marquette had, and certainly none had sent as many as 70 of their former players to the NFL, as Marquette had done.

As Prof. Thomas Jablonsky notes in his Milwaukee’s Jesuit University: Marquette, 1881-1981 (2007), the O’Donnell presidency (1948-1962) is remembered as a period of impressive growth for Marquette, in terms of the size of the student body (to over 12,000), the university’s physical plant, and the quality of its academic programs. However, it is possible that the Marquette football program may have been a casualty of the university overextending its resources at the end of the 1950’s.

Moreover, the fact that Marquette eliminated football more than 50 years ago does not mean that the sport could not be brought back. Two of Marquette’s fellow members of the Big East Conference–Georgetown and Villanova (which dropped football in 1981)–have subsequently reestablished their football programs at the Division I, Playoff Championship Subdivision (formerly called Division IAA) with great success.

Duquesne, Fordham, and St. Francis (PA) have followed the same route in reestablishing football, and, in addition, at least four Catholic schools—the University of Dayton, Marist, Sacred Heart, and the University of San Diego, which did not play in the “University” Division or Division 1 before the 1990’s—have also moved into the Division I, Playoff Championship Subdivision.

Although the Marquette administration and Athletic Department have long insisted that the subject of reviving the football program is not on the agenda, now may be the time to reopen the question of whether or not it would make sense for Marquette to bring back football in the 21st century.

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Danae Davis: Growing Pearls Among Central City Teen Age Girls

Danae Davis was well along in a distinguished career in executive positions in government and corporations. But she was approaching 50, she felt she needed to do something that had more meaning for her, and she was distressed about the situations of so many young people in Milwaukee.

A friend, Colleen Fitzgerald (now an executive coach for Marquette University), was founder of a small organization that aimed to help central city teenage girls make good decisions about their lives. It was called Pearls for Teen Girls. Fitzgerald suggested to Davis that she become executive director. It paid a lot less than corporate work. But it was exactly the kind of thing Davis was looking for.

That was six years ago. Pearls has grown from serving about 500 girls a year to about 1,100. Davis says she is serious about growing it to 10,000 girls a year. And its track record is impressive – nearly 100% of participating girls who have reached the appropriate age have graduated high school on time and gone on to post-secondary education. Nearly 100% have avoided becoming pregnant.

Davis told Mike Gousha during an “On the Issues” session at Eckstein Hall on Nov. 15 that Pearls is built around small groups of girls ages 10 to 19 who meet weekly for sessions that mix fun with programs focusing on serious issues. The result is a support structure for girls to pursue constructive futures.

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Legal Anomalies in Federal Indian Law, Part II—Tribal Jurisdiction Over Non-Indians

Federal Indian Law—the legal provisions and doctrines governing the respective statuses of, and relations among, the federal, state, and tribal governments—is replete with seeming anomalies when compared to the background of typical domestic law in the United States. The purpose of this post, and of the series of which it is a part, is to identify and examine such anomalies in an effort to acquaint readers with the metes and bounds of Federal Indian Law, while shedding some light on the origins and perhaps the future of this unique legal realm.

The prior post examined one such anomaly, namely, the permissibility of the government’s differential treatment of Indian tribes and their members despite the U.S. Constitution’s guarantee of equal protection. In this, the second installment in the series, another topic of significant contemporary interest will be surveyed. This is the oddly diminished character of Indian tribal sovereignty and, in particular, the extent to which tribes, in their own territories, lack criminal and civil authority over non-Indians or non-tribal members.

The capacity to enact and enforce laws is, of course, one of the hallmarks of sovereignty within the Western political tradition. This includes both criminal laws and civil laws, the latter often being divided into powers of regulation, taxation, and adjudication. It is typically accepted, moreover, that the reach of a sovereign’s laws extends along two axes: citizenship and territory. That is, the sovereign has the authority to govern not only its citizens but also all others who enter its territory. Thus, for example, inquiries into the jurisdiction of courts over a person or his property ordinarily entail an examination of the person’s citizenship and/or the relationship between the person’s conduct or property and the territory of the sovereign to which the courts belong.

In recent decades, however, Indian tribal sovereignty has increasingly been confined to a single axis—that of citizenship—leaving tribes largely powerless to enforce their laws against non-Indians who, within the tribe’s territory, commit criminal conduct or engage in activities that would normally be susceptible to regulation, taxation, or adjudication. Perhaps surprisingly, the institution primarily responsible for this diminishing conception of tribal sovereignty is not Congress, which the Supreme Court has repeatedly described as having “plenary power” over Indian affairs, but rather the Court itself.

Continue ReadingLegal Anomalies in Federal Indian Law, Part II—Tribal Jurisdiction Over Non-Indians