Restricting Liberty in the Name of Equality

Robust equality is a relatively recent part of the American constitutional landscape, rooted in a limited way in the Declaration of Independence and then formally embraced in the Constitution’s 14th Amendment, ratified in 1868, though it took another near century to buttress that guarantee with meaningful legal force. By contrast, liberty—e.g., of religious exercise, of speech, and of the press—and its attendant guarantee of non-deprivation without due process of law, go back to the nation’s founding if not decades and in some cases centuries before.

In recent years, however, with great domestic and international dynamics at work, there has ascended into prominence and influence a norm of equality or nondiscrimination, or an unabashedly pursued equality of outcome, effectively supplanting the centrality of individual or group liberty as the citizen’s core constitutional guarantees.

Part of this has been achieved by legitimate historical and other academic research and theorizing, though it should be noted that at times the neutrality of those undertaking such efforts may rightly be questioned. Part of this sea change, though, has come from a public and university-sanctioned tolerance for the suppression of viewpoints that conflict with the modern ethos of equality, variously defined. Many of these developments, moreover, have resulted from outside pressures—from interest groups to like-minded accrediting organizations—that seemingly leave the institutions with little choice but to comply with their dictates.

As repeatedly documented by, among others groups, the Foundation for Individual Rights in Education and the Center for Campus Free Speech, colleges and universities ironically have sometimes been the most egregious censors of speech under the banner of equality (or of perceived equal treatment), which perversely betrays a subordination of the time-honored values of truth-seeking and knowledge propagation to relatively fleeting interest-group pressures and ideological expediency.

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The Civil Jurisdiction of Indian Tribes

This is the fourth in a series of posts addressing commonly asked questions regarding American Indians, Indian Tribes, and the law. The first post dealt with casinos, taxation, and hunting and fishing rights; the second focused on the relationship between the unique legal treatment of Indian tribes or their members and the U.S. Constitution’s guarantee of equal protection; and the third explored the criminal jurisdiction of tribes. This post will examine the civil jurisdiction of tribes, both over members and especially over non-members, in each its three major forms: regulation, taxation, and adjudication.

As noted in the last post, tribal jurisdiction (not unlike federal and state jurisdiction) is uniquely limited in a manner that reflects the place and circumstances of tribes on the American legal landscape. In particular, each tribe is said to retain its original or inherent jurisdiction—the sovereign authority possessed prior to European contact and the subsequent formation of the United States—except insofar as such jurisdiction has been (1) relinquished or ceded by tribe itself through a treaty or other agreement, (2) expressly abrogated or taken away by Congress, or (3) deemed by the judiciary, especially the U.S. Supreme Court, to have been implicitly lost by virtue of the tribe’s historical circumstances and contemporary status.

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The Criminal Jurisdiction of Indian Tribes

This is the third in a series of posts addressing commonly asked questions regarding American Indians, Indian Tribes, and the law. The first post dealt with casinos, taxation, and hunting and fishing rights, while the second focused on the relationship between the unique legal treatment of Indian tribes or their members and the U.S. Constitution’s guarantee of equal protection. This post will explore the criminal jurisdiction of tribes, with the expectation that one or more future posts will similarly explore the criminal jurisdiction of the federal and state governments in relation to Indians or conduct on Indian lands.

Sovereignty, as conceptualized in the Western legal-political tradition, has customarily included the power to enact and enforce a criminal code against persons who, within the sovereign’s territory or against its citizenry, commit conduct injurious to health, safety, welfare, and morals. This is a theoretical standard, however, and today across the globe as well as in the United States—and not just with regard to Indian tribes—one can observe forms of sovereignty that include degrees of diminished (or less-than-plenary) criminal jurisdiction.

The most obvious domestic example involves the respective authority of the federal and state governments.

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