Federal Law & Legal System – Page 165 – Marquette University Law School Faculty Blog

Seventh Circuit Week in Review: Terrible Tragedy=Maximum Sentence?

Post author:Michael M. O'Hear
Post published:February 22, 2009
Post category:Criminal Law & Process Federal Criminal Law & Process Federal Sentencing Seventh Circuit

The Seventh Circuit had four new opinions in criminal cases last week. The court did not break new ground in any of them, but one raises some interesting sentencing issues. I’ll first discuss that case, United States v. Wise (No. 08-2794), and then briefly summarize the other three, which dealt with the definition of “crack cocaine,” disparity in the sentencing of codefendants, and the constitutionality of a gun possession statute, respectively.

First, the Wise case arose out of terrible tragedy. Wise left a loaded firearm on a window ledge in his girlfrend’s apartment, where it could be reached by children. You can already guess where this is headed: a four-year old left unattended in the room for a few minutes picked up the gun, the gun discharged, and a two-year old was killed. Wise was charged in Illinois state court with reckless endangerment of a child resulting in the child’s death. Wise, however, was a felon, and so his possession of the firearm was a federal crime, too. State charges were apparently dropped, as federal prosecutors charged Wise with the gun possession crime. Wise pled guilty. The sentencing judge decided to sentence Wise above the recommended sentencing guidelines range and give Wise the maximum, ten years. Wise challenged his sentence on appeal, and the Seventh Circuit (per Judge Evans) affirmed.

Failures of Refugee Law and the Inhumane Prospect of Deporting Settled Liberians from the United States

Post author:Jessica E. Slavin
Post published:February 21, 2009
Post category:Federal Law & Legal System Human Rights Immigration Law

This semester I am teaching a seminar entitled Comparative Refugee and Asylum Law, and last week, one of my students in that course, Vintee Sawnhey, sent me a l ink to a news article about the thousands of Liberians who fear deportation from the United States because the “deferred enforced departure” status that President Bush extended to them in September 2007 is scheduled to end on March 31, 2009.

I should probably preface the rest of this long post by explaining that the article Vintee sent me was especially interesting to me because I worked with many Liberians during and just after law school, at Minnesota Advocates for Human Rights, now called The Advocates for Human Rights. Most of my work for that organization involved interviewing prospective asylum-seekers, to assess their credibility and the strength of their claims for asylum. My work there happened from late 1996 through early 1999, and many of our clients were Liberians. Minnesota has a relatively large population of Liberians. (You may want to check out the Minnesota Star-Tribune’s really nice website about Liberians in Minnesota.)

Anyway, as Vintee pointed out, the situation of these Liberians is “pretty relevant to some of our current readings” in my asylum law seminar. Indeed, the situation of the Liberians facing possible deportation later this year illustrates two of the most important ideas in the course: (1) the legal definition of “refugee” does not include people fleeing from generalized civil war conditions, and (2) offering “temporary” humanitarian protection in place of permanent refugee status to such individuals is problematic, because countries experiencing civil war do not become stable very quickly, and human beings build new lives in the meantime.

Okay, Judge, You Hit Your Number or Die in This Room*

Post author:Richard M. Esenberg
Post published:February 19, 2009
Post category:First Amendment Judges & Judicial Process Political Processes & Rhetoric Western District of Wisconsin Wisconsin Court System

Much of the attention following yesterday’s decision in Siefert v. Alexander focuses upon the invalidation of prohibitions against judges or judicial candidates belonging to political parties and endorsing partisan candidates for office. That part of Judge Crabb’s decision seems to me, given the balance between regulatory interests and the protection of speech struck by the United States Supreme Court in Republican Party v. White, to be clearly correct.

And not, in my view, very momentous. Many judges have prejudicial partisan affiliations and, in highly salient elections, it is not hard for the public to discern whether a candidate is a Republican or Democrat. In fact, one could argue that allowing candidates to claim partisan affiliation is a relatively efficient way to provide pertinent information to voters in campaigns where discussion of the issues is difficult and often cramped by legal and customary restrictions. It’s not that we expect judges to rule in whatever way their party wants (although, as Judge Crabb points out, the prior partisan affiliation of federal judges is strongly correlated with voting patterns), but that partisan affiliation may tell us something (admittedly broad and general) about a candidate’s judicial philosophy.

More significant, it seems to me, is that part of the decision striking down the Code of Judicial Conduct’s prohibition against the personal solicitation of funds by judges and judicial candidates.