Friends of Scott Walker v. GAB Changes the Recall Rules Mid-Stream

Today, Judge J. Mac Davis ruled that the Government Accountability Board must take “affirmative steps to identify and strike duplicate, fictitious or unrecognizable signatures as it reviews the recall petitions expected to be filed against Gov. Scott Walker.”  The ruling comes in the case of Friends of Scott Walker v. GAB, filed in Waukesha County Circuit Court on December 15, 2011. The complaint in the case sought a declaratory judgment from the court that the procedures of the Government Accountability Board, whereby the GAB accepted (but did not necessarily count) duplicative signatures on recall petitions, violated the United States Constitution, the Wisconsin Constitution and Wisconsin law.  The complaint in the case is available here.

The GAB responded to the lawsuit by arguing that the Wisconsin statutes provide a clearly defined procedure that allows elected officials subject to recall to instigate challenges to any signatures that appear to be duplicative, fictitious or unrecognizable. After the GAB accepts the recall petitions, there is a period of 10 days in which the signatures may be challenged by the official. It is at the challenge stage that suspect signatures should be identified and removed, according to the GAB, and not earlier when the recall petitions are accepted by the agency. The GAB also contended that there was no provision in the Wisconsin Statutes that granted the agency the authority to do what the Friends of Scott Walker asked it to do.

Judge Davis disagreed with the GAB, and earlier today he ruled that the GAB is required to take affirmative action that will have the effect of reducing the burden that the Friends of Scott Walker would otherwise face. This is because the GAB must now identify and remove suspect signatures on its own initiative.

Why is the GAB obligated to do this, when there is no statutory language that explicitly places such an obligation on the agency?

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Learned Hand on the Politics of Judicial Appointments

In debates over potential reforms to the judicial appointments process, there seems to be a pervasive sense that the problem of politicization is a relatively new one. In terms of the frequency with which the Senate rejects even highly qualified nominees and the extent to which overt partisanship has crept into the evaluation of candidates for lower courts, that sense seems pretty accurate. More than either of his two most recent predecessors, President Obama has had a difficult time securing Senate approval of his picks for the judiciary, as I previously discussed here.

I think it’s helpful to appreciate, however, that the basic problem of partisanship trumping merit as a determinant of judicial appointments is anything but new. Recently, I was reading Gerald Gunther’s biography of Learned Hand and came across a reminder of how the appointments process has long been an overwhelmingly political affair, even for lower-court judgeships. Gunther explains that when Jerome Frank’s death in the late 1950s left vacant a seat on the Second Circuit, advocates from opposing political orientations lobbied heavily for their favored candidates to receive the next appointment. Many Republicans pushed for the selection of Leonard Moore, the U.S. Attorney for E.D.N.Y., while Democrats favored Irving Kaufman, the federal judge who had presided over the espionage trial of Julius and Ethel Rosenberg. Moreover, many on both sides appear to have viewed the choice between Moore and Kaufman as essentially political rather than merit-based. One of the significant arguments made in favor of Kaufman, for example, was that elevating him to the Second Circuit could function as a way for the President and Senate to signal their approval of his handling of the Rosenberg trial, of which leftist organizations had been fiercely critical.

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No Harm, No Foul — But How Do You Know If There Was Harm?

Yesterday, the U.S. Supreme Court agreed to hear a case that gives the Court an opportunity to clarify a longstanding ambiguity in harmless error law.  Even if a defendant’s procedural rights have been violated at trial, a conviction will not be reversed on appeal if the error was harmless.  However, the Court has at different times articulated the harmless error standard in two different ways, without ever clearly indicating whether the two formulations are substantively different and, if so, which one is preferred.

In the new case, Vasquez v. United States (No. 11-199), the defendant’s cert. petition focused squarely on this ambiguity, arguing that the majority opinion below (635 F.3d 889 (7th Cir. 2011)) rested on one formulation, while the dissenting opinion rested on the other.  In Vasquez’s view, the choice of harmless error standard is more-or-less dispositive in his case, thus making the case an appropriate platform for deciding which standard is the right one.  In its response, however, the government disputes that there is any substantive difference between the standards.

Here are the (allegedly) competing standards.

Continue ReadingNo Harm, No Foul — But How Do You Know If There Was Harm?