Criminal Law & Process – Page 13 – Marquette University Law School Faculty Blog

Flynn Adamantly Defends Police Department and His Work as He Retires as Chief

Post author:Alan J. Borsuk
Post published:February 9, 2018
Post category:Civil Rights Criminal Law & Process Milwaukee Public Speakers at Marquette

Near the end of their hour-long conversation, Mike Gousha asked outgoing Milwaukee Police Chief Edward Flynn what was next for him.

“Really nothing much,” Flynn said. He’s going to go back to Virginia where his family lives and spend more time with his children and grandchildren. Maybe he’ll do some consulting ahead. But, first, “I do need to de-stress a little bit, despite how relaxed I’m appearing.”

The line got a big laugh from the audience in the Lubar Center at Eckstein Hall for the “On the Issues with Mike Gousha” on Feb. 8. As he finished a decade as Milwaukee’s police chief, Flynn was fired up, outspoken, and more than a bit emotional and angry.

Marsy’s Law in Wisconsin

Post author:K.C. Parker
Post published:January 23, 2018
Post category:Constitutional Law Criminal Law & Process Public Student Contributor

Have you ever heard something that, almost immediately after hearing it, bounced your thoughts from the possible benefits to the seriously questionable outcomes that might follow, and left you swinging back and forth between the two? This is exactly what happened to me just recently after hearing about Marsy’s Law coming to Wisconsin. As it stands, I can get behind the general idea of the law, but I do have some doubts—problems, even—with the way the law is being pushed forward.

“Marsy’s Law” is the idea that crime victims, and the families of crime victims (who become victims by association) should have equal rights to those who are accused of victimizing the family. According to the web site for Marsy’s Law for All, the law is named for Marsalee (Marsy) Nicholas, a “beautiful, vibrant University of California Santa Barbara student, who was stalked and killed by her ex-boyfriend in 1983.” (Quote from Marsy’s Law for All) One week after Marsy’s murder, some of her family members entered a grocery store and were confronted by the man who was accused of murdering Marsy. Marsy’s alleged murderer had been let out on bail and the family had not known about it.

Marsy’s Law for All argues that the United States Constitution and every state constitution have a detailed set of rights for people who are accused of crimes, but the United States Constitution and 15 state constitutions do not have a list of rights for victims of crime. As I am writing this, the web site for Marsy’s Law argues that the United States Constitution has 20 individual rights for those accused of a crime, but none for the victims of crime. States, on the other hand, have been making some progress. California, Illinois, North Dakota, South Dakota, Montana, and Ohio have passed Marsy’s Law, with efforts to adopt the law currently underway in Kentucky, Maine, North Carolina, Georgia, Nevada, Idaho, Oklahoma, and here in Wisconsin.

New Cases on the Constitutionality of Long Sentences for Juveniles: The Graham Saga Continues

Post author:Michael M. O'Hear
Post published:September 5, 2017
Post category:Constitutional Interpretation Constitutional Law Criminal Law & Process Federal Criminal Law & Process Federal Sentencing Federalism Public U.S. Supreme Court

In Graham v. Florida, 560 U.S. 48 (2010), the U.S. Supreme Court barred the sentence of life without the possibility of parole (LWOP) for crimes committed by anyone under eighteen years of age. Grounded in the Cruel and Unusual Punishments Clause of the Eighth Amendment, the Court’s holding recognized only one exception: juvenile LWOP might be permissible in cases involving homicide.

Despite its seemingly straightforward character, the Graham holding has spawned considerable litigation in the lower courts over its scope and application. Two interesting appellate decisions from last month highlight some of the difficulties.

In the first, U.S. v. Mathurin, the Eleventh Circuit had to consider whether a 685-month prison term should be treated as the functional equivalent of an LWOP sentence for Eighth Amendment purposes.