Knowledge, Intent, and Knowledge of Someone Else’s Intent

As yesterday’s post explained, contributory copyright liability emerged in the nineteenth century, but was not given a determinative test until 1970, in the Second Circuit’s opinion in Gershwin Publishing Corp. v. Columbia Artists Management, Inc. Under that test, a secondary actor could be held contributorily liable for someone else’s infringement if the actor had knowledge of the infringing activity and materially contributed to it.

That test was difficult enough to apply consistently on its own. But in 2005, the Supreme Court threw a further monkey wrench into the works when it resurrected Gershwin’s use of the term “inducement.” In a case involving the distribution of filesharing software to a group largely consisting of infringers, the Court stated the test for contributory liability as follows:

One infringes contributorily by intentionally inducing or encouraging direct infringement, see Gershwin Pub. Corp. v. Columbia Artists Management, Inc., 443 F.2d 1159, 1162 (C.A.2 1971)…. [T]hese doctrines of secondary liability emerged from common law principles and are well established in the law, [Sony Corp. v. Universal City Studios, 464 U.S.,] at 486 (Blackmun, J., dissenting); Kalem Co. v. Harper Brothers, 222 U.S. 55, 62–63 (1911); Gershwin Pub. Corp. v. Columbia Artists Management, supra, at 1162; 3 M. Nimmer & D. Nimmer, Copyright § 12.04[A] (2005).

MGM v. Grokster, 545 U.S. 913, 930–31 (2005).

For the past two decades it’s been unclear what the Grokster Court meant to do here. Was it reformulating the traditional test for contributory infringement to focus only on intentional inducement, rather than knowledge and material contribution? If so, then why the unqualified citations to Gershwin? If not, did this passage just add inducement as an additional form of indirect liability, or did it change Gershwin somehow?

Lower courts, for the most part, read Grokster the last way—inducement was not a complete substitution for the traditional material contribution test, but the traditional test didn’t come through unscathed either. If Grokster was just resurrecting “inducement” as a way of satisfying the second element of Gershwin, then why does Grokster talk about intent? There’s no mention of intent in Gershwin, only knowledge. If Grokster instead intended to add a third form of indirect liability to copyright law, why does the Court call it “contributor[y]” infringement?

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Contributory Copyright Liability Back Before the Supreme Court

The exterior of the U.S. Supreme Court building with white stone columns and a white facade.

On Monday, the Supreme Court is going to hear oral argument in a significant copyright case, Cox Communications v. Sony Music Entertainment. The issue before the Court is the extent of contributory copyright infringement liability, something the Court has considered twice in recent decades, in the famous Betamax case (Sony v. Universal) in 1984, and in MGM v. Grokster in 2005.

I’m interested in almost any appellate case on copyright law, but I was interested enough in this one that I submitted an amicus brief to the Court arguing how it should come out. This post will introduce the dispute in Cox case and how it emerges from the history of contributory liability; tomorrow I’ll explain how the Supreme Court’s prior intervention in Grokster has added to the doctrinal confusion; and finally on Sunday I’ll explain why I decided to take the time to write an amicus brief. Hopefully on Monday I’ll have time to do a quick review of the argument.

The Cox case represents yet another battle between content owners and technology companies over the extent of indirect liability for copyright infringement, that is, liability internet service providers might have for the infringing acts of their users. For the past two decades, much of that fight has been over the conditional immunity for ISPs provided in 1998’s Digital Millennium Copyright Act, but the Cox case returns the debate to the underlying obligations imposed by copyright law itself: when does an intermediary like Cox have to stop infringers from using its service, and when can it safely regard those infringements as Somebody Else’s Problem?

The legal question here quickly enters some deep policy waters. Intermediary liability is recognized in many areas of the law, from torts to securities fraud to criminal law to all areas of intellectual property. To be effective, intermediary liability needs to strike a careful balance. First, the direct wrongdoers have to be, in some way, difficult to pursue—if they aren’t, then there’s no need to impose liability on someone else. And second, the intermediary has to have both the knowledge and the ability to narrowly target the bad acts without causing unnecessary spillover harms to beneficial activities.

Part of the problem in achieving that balance in the modern era is that the very notion of case-by-base balancing—by courts, by regulators, by almost anyone—has gotten a bad name. As I argued in my recent article The Grapes of Roth, that style of decision-making has faded, replaced by attempts to limit judicial discretion by rigidly following the text of either statutory provisions or multi-part tests.

Recently, however, I thought I detected some inclination by some of the justices to cut back against that trend and instead emphasize that the overall balance of intermediary liability emerges from the interplay of various considerations. So I decided to give that inclination whatever additional nudge I could with my brief.

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Climate litigation comes to Wisconsin

Wisconsin’s climate is warming. Despite its characterization in some quarters as a “climate haven” and destination for people migrating away from the worst impacts of climate change, the state is not immune to some of those same consequences. Even setting aside the significantly warming temperature here, the effects already include more frequent, intense precipitation events, increased flood risk, and decreased opportunities for winter recreation. Wisconsinites living in the southeastern part of the state will long remember the August 9-10, 2025 rainfall event that hammered some areas with over 14 inches of rain in under 24 hours, leading to widespread flooding. No doubt that was a “1,000-year storm” by reference to past experience. But when it comes to climate, the past is no longer a good guide to the future; indeed, some parts of the state have recently experienced multiple “500-year storms” or “500-year floods” within only a few years of time.

Perhaps it is no coincidence, then, that as the state increasingly feels the effects of climate change, climate law cases are similarly piling up here. From constitutional claims that seek to reform the implementation of energy law in the state, to litigation over the federal government’s efforts to claw back funding for the development of renewable energy resources, Wisconsin has become increasingly involved with legal battles over the climate. Interestingly, one of the cases prominently invokes a constitutional doctrine connected to the state’s water resources.

Dunn v. Public Service Commission. In August 2025, fifteen Wisconsin youth filed suit in the Circuit Court for Dane County alleging that certain Wisconsin statutes “create and perpetuate a fossil fuel-dominated electricity sector,” resulting in climate change-driven injuries to plaintiffs caused by air pollution, extreme weather events, and degradation of Wisconsin’s public trust (water) resources. Plaintiffs assert this amounts to a violation of the Wisconsin Constitution’s guarantees of life, liberty, and “a stable climate system.” That last phrase doesn’t appear in the constitution, but plaintiffs argue that it is inherent in the enumerated rights of life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness. The case is a cousin of similar youth-led suits filed across the country, including a recent notable success in the Supreme Court of Montana.

The claims involve the work of the Wisconsin Public Service Commission (PSC), which is charged with approving the construction of new facilities that will generate electricity in the state. The Dunn plaintiffs allege that one Wisconsin statute unlawfully prohibits the PSC from considering the air pollution these proposed facilities will emit, leading to an artificial bias in favor of electricity generation from fossil fuels rather than renewable resources. A second set of challenged laws, plaintiffs allege, creates an artificial and unlawful ceiling on the amount of renewable energy generation the PSC may require energy providers to supply.

Alternatively – and particularly thought-provoking for those interested in Wisconsin water law – the plaintiffs allege that the same statutes also violate the Wisconsin public trust doctrine by depriving the plaintiffs of “the [constitutionally guaranteed] right to access, enjoy, and use public trust waters.” Over the years I have written several times in this space about the Wisconsin public trust doctrine, including its recent re-solidification after a period of erosion. In short, Wisconsin courts have interpreted Article IX, Section 1 of the state’s constitution to mean that Wisconsin holds its navigable waters in trust for its people, but the courts have had some difficulty operationalizing exactly what that duty requires in terms of day-to-day management of Wisconsin waters. The plaintiffs in Dunn argue that climate-driven damage to Wisconsin water resources enabled by the PSC’s (statutorily mandated) decisions related to electricity generation equates to a breach of the state’s constitutional public trust obligations. If a Wisconsin court accepts that framing, Dunn could become a nationally significant point of climate law evolution.

While Dunn targets the legal architecture of the state’s energy system, another pending case is focused on funding for the development of renewable energy generation in Wisconsin.

Maryland Clean Energy Center, et al. v. United States. Wisconsin (through the Wisconsin Economic Development Corporation, a public-private entity created in 2011 to replace the former Department of Commerce) has joined other states and organizations suing over EPA’s decision to terminate the “Solar for All” program, which is aimed at improving access to solar energy infrastructure in lower-income and disadvantaged communities. The program was slated to fund about $7 billion in solar projects; Wisconsin would have received over $60 million of that amount. The controversy involves the recent reconciliation law passed in July, which Wisconsin and the other plaintiffs argue only rescinds unobligated balances of the funding, and is not a retroactive repeal of funding already issued under the program. In a related case, EPA has called such claims “hopeless,” arguing that Congress provided reasonable grounds for getting rid of the entire program and its associated funding.

Enbridge Line 5. The Wisconsin-based dispute over the rerouting of Enbridge Line 5, an oil and gas pipeline that crosses northern Wisconsin on its way from Canada to Michigan, is another fossil fuel-related case with national relevance. Litigation over the pipeline, and the fossil fuel resources it transports, is ongoing in several different jurisdictions. In our state, the Bad River Band of Lake Superior Chippewa has challenged the Wisconsin Department of Natural Resources’ issuance of permits approving a 41-mile new section of the pipeline, arguing that the DNR’s approval fails to comply with Wisconsin’s environmental laws and will damage wetlands and water resources, thereby threatening the Band’s way of life. The case is currently pending before a Wisconsin administrative law judge.

Though Wisconsin isn’t the first state that comes to mind in a conversation about climate risk, the outcome of these cases will be very significant to the development of climate law both within and outside the state.

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