Constitutional Law – Page 34 – Marquette University Law School Faculty Blog

Life in the Digital Age: Is There Such a Thing as a Reasonable Expectation of Privacy?

Post author:Amelia Bizzaro
Post published:May 21, 2013
Post category:Civil Rights Constitutional Law Criminal Law & Process Public

A few weeks ago, I presented a webinar about the Fourth Amendment in the digital age. In preparation, I tried to find out as much as I can about the different ways law enforcement uses technology in investigations and if and when those uses constitute a search under the Fourth Amendment. What I discovered, boiled down to its most basic, is that if law enforcement can do it in a low-tech way, they can do it high tech. So, for example, if an officer standing on the sidewalk could see into your backyard, then a camera placed on a pole with the same viewpoint would work just as well.

The leading case right now is United States v. Jones, the U.S. Supreme Court’s GPS case from last summer, authored by Justice Scalia. Originally, whether something constituted a search for purposes of the Fourth Amendment had been closely tied to common-law trespass and a person’s connection to property. Over the years, the property-based approach was somewhat pushed aside and the focus was on protecting people, not places. The concept “reasonable expectation of privacy” was born and had been the focus of Fourth Amendment jurisprudence. Then came Jones. Jones circles back to property and the concept of trespass. Under Jones, trespass plus an effort to obtain information is a search, warranting the protections of the Fourth Amendment.

Does Federal Law Actually Preempt Relaxed State Marijuana Laws?

Post author:Scott C. Idleman
Post published:April 9, 2013
Post category:Congress & Congressional Power Constitutional Law Criminal Law & Process Federalism Public Speakers at Marquette

The Cato Institute’s Ilya Shapiro recently spoke at the Law School concerning the status of relaxed state marijuana laws in light of the federal Controlled Substances Act’s continued prohibition of activities that these state laws now allow. This is a timely question with, it turns out, a less-than-certain answer. More precisely, it demands an answer that is more nuanced, and less categorical, than one might initially be inclined to give.

One’s initial answer is likely that these state laws are preempted—that is, rendered void and unenforceable—because of the federal statute. It is conventional constitutional doctrine, after all, that the U.S. Constitution’s Supremacy Clause makes valid federal law supreme over conflicting state law. Moreover, because the U.S. Supreme Court in Gonzales v. Raich (2005) deemed the federal marijuana prohibition to be a valid exercise of Congress’ commerce power, the specific question of whether state marijuana laws are vulnerable to preemption seems already to have been answered.

Mr. Shapiro makes an important observation, however.

Constitutional Adjudication and Social Division – A Judicial Perspective

Post author:Anna High
Post published:February 26, 2013
Post category:Civil Rights Constitutional Law Human Rights Public

I am pleased to be leading a very vibrant seminar this semester, during which we contemplate the judicial process as evident in constitutional/human rights decisions from jurisdictions as far-flung as Germany, Jamaica and India. Covering a range of substantive topics, from torture to religious freedom to socio-economic rights, our discussions and analysis can be distilled down to two underlying questions: what do judges say they are doing, and what are judges actually doing? A plethora of historical/social/contextual factors feed into the judicial process, and determine the scope and nature of the project of constitutional adjudication.

The upcoming SCOTUS decisions on the 1996 Defense of Marriage Act (denying federal benefits to same-sex couples that are legally married in their states) and California’s Proposition 8 (a voter-approved ban on same-sex marriage), in addition to their potentially profound personal significance to persons on all sides of the marriage debate, will no doubt provide rich fodder for human rights jurists.

So it is timely, I believe, to bring attention to the story of South Africa’s constitutional adjudication of this sensitive issue, and to consider the role the South African Constitutional Court sees itself playing when it deals with the complexities of constitutional rights.