Marquette University Law School Faculty Blog

Researchers at CERN laboratory in Switzerland announced this week that they believe they have evidence of the existence of the Higgs boson, or Higgs particle. The Higgs boson and the associated Higgs field help to explain, among other things, how particles achieve mass. In 1964 physicist Peter Higgs and five other researchers theorized the Higgs boson. Researchers at CERN have been colliding particles in the Large Hydron Collider to look for the Higgs boson.

The Higgs boson is part of the Standard Model theory, which explains the interactions and characteristics of subatomic particles. Researchers had accounted for the Higgs boson in their Standard Model calculations over the years. In November 2011, a CERN physicist said, “’For our theory to be right, we need the Higgs to exist. If it doesn’t, we need something to replace it.’” The question now appears to be what kind of Higgs boson researchers have observed.

Reading about the Higgs boson announcement reminded me of Professor Lawrence Tribe’s book The Invisible Constitution. The Higgs boson and the United States Constitution don’t at first glance have much in common, but the way Tribe approaches interpreting the Constitution parallels the approach of theoretical physicists in creating models that explain the invisible rules that govern the physical universe. In fact, Tribe himself draws an analogy to physics throughout the book.

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Paul Clement’s arguments did not carry the day when it came to the outcome a year ago of the historic United States Supreme Court decision on the constitutionality of the individual mandate in the federal Affordable Care Act, popularly known as Obamacare. But his arguments were supported by a majority of the justices on important points that will have an impact for years to come in Congress and in the judicial system, Clement said in delivering the Hallows Lecture 2013 in the Appellate Courtroom of Marquette University Law School’s Eckstein Hall this week.

Clement, formerly solicitor general of the United States, has argued 65 cases before the Supreme Court. He was the lead attorney in presenting arguments to the Court on behalf of 26 states that challenged the health care law. The Court heard a remarkable six hours of arguments focused on several major aspects of the challenge.

“The challenge for the challengers was to run the table to the tune of going 15 for 15” on legal points involved in the case, Clement said. “The good news is the challengers went 14 for 15. The bad news, from the perspective of my clients, is that 14 out 15 isn’t good enough. . . . Getting a really satisfying opinion from four justices still counts as a loss.”

The question at the heart of the case was whether there would continue to be a meaningful limit on the power of the federal government to impose laws such as the Affordable Care Act on the states, Clement said. He said, “I do think in some respects, the single most important takeaway from the decision was there were not five votes to say that there really is no meaningful judicial review of federalism constraints on Congress. There are constraints—again, the power is very substantial, very broad in the wake of the New Deal precedents of the Court, but it remains a limited power.” Read more »

Published reports of the death of Robert Bork on December 19 not surprisingly dwelled on the most controversial events in his long life in the law.  As Solicitor General under President Nixon, Bork in 1975 carried out orders to fire the Watergate special prosecutor.  In 1987, Bork was nominated for the Supreme Court by President Reagan but then rejected by the Senate.  During the 1990s and 2000s, Bork, while employed by conservative think tanks, vigorously argued that elitist liberals were trying to take over the judiciary.

For my own part, I recall Robert Bork from my first year of law school and from the time before he became a prominent national figure.  It seems hard to believe, but I actually had Professor Bork for Constitutional Law.  I also had Professor Bork for Legal Research and Writing because the Yale Law School in those distant days folded each student’s instruction in legal research and writing into an arbitrarily selected substantive first-year course.

I have no evidence that Professor Bork ever read the assorted memoranda and briefs I wrote “under his tutelage,” but I certainly recall his approach to Constitutional Law.  Read more »

There are more than 50 polydactl (6 toed) cats at the Hemingway Museum in Key West Florida. The cats are descended from six-toed felines raised by Hemingway at his house in Key West, which is now a museum. The cats roam the grounds and the house at will. Several years ago, a visitor became concerned about the cats’ welfare, and reported the issue to the US Department of Agriculture. Long story short, the USDA decided the cats fell under the Animal Welfare Act with its accompanying regulations and requirements. The museum filed suit stating that the USDA did not have authority over the cats, the judge disagreed, and the Museum appealed.

Last week a three-judge appeals court panel (11th Circuit) decided the case using a broad interpretation of the Animal Welfare Act. The court also evaluated whether the cats “substantially affect” interstate commerce under the Commerce Clause. One part of the analysis determined that the Hemingway Museum purposefully uses the cats for marketing campaigns to attract visitors from outside of Florida, and as such, their exhibition has a commercial purpose and affects interstate commerce. You can see more about the case here and here.

In Wisconsin, the Home Rule Amendment to the Wisconsin Constitution grants cities and villages the power to determine their local affairs and government, subject only to the constitution itself and uniform legislative enactments of statewide concern.  The Wisconsin Supreme Court has recognized that the Home Rule Amendment serves not only to empower cities and villages, but also to curtail the power of the state legislature to act within the sphere of local affairs.  Van Gilder v. City of Madison, 267 N.W. 25 (1936).  The job of defining the proper province of constitutional home rule authority (i.e., what constitutes a matter of “local affairs and government” or a matter of “statewide concern”) falls to the courts and, not surprisingly, it is no easy task.  Given the concurrent interest of state and local government in many governmental functions, one may argue that such functions cannot be so classified except by arbitrary reasoning.

Notwithstanding the difficulty in defining its exact reach, local home rule is worth preserving and worth defending.  Read more »

The Declaration of Independence, the United States Constitution, the Civil Rights Act of 1866 – as great as the first two were, it was the third that put in place the concepts of American citizenship and the civil rights of all Americans that are part of the bedrock of American life, prominent historian Eric Foner said in a lecture at Eckstein Hall.

Delivering Marquette Law School’s 2012 Robert F. Boden Lecture last week, Foner focused on the origins in American law of birthright citizenship, the principle that (with immaterial exceptions) anyone born in the United States is a citizen and has basic rights that go with citizenship.

Foner, DeWitt Clinton Professor of History at Columbia University, said many people assume that the principle of “equality under the law” dates back to the origins of the United States – or, as he put it humorously, that the nation was born perfect and has gotten better ever since.

In reality, he said, the nation was definitely not premised on equality under the law in its early stages. For one thing, the Constitution itself did not give citizenship to even free black people, much less to slaves. And, Foner said, citizenship issues were controlled by individual states, rather than the federal government. Every state in the nation had laws that treated black people worse than white people, he noted.

The great changes that declared all men (women’s issues came later) born in America to have basic rights, such as the right to own property and take disputes to court, came with the Civil Rights Act of 1866, put into law by Congress over President Andrew Johnson’s veto, and the subsequent adoption of the Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitution.

The rights extended by those federal enactments and others in the Reconstruction Era were violated with impunity for many decades. But the rights they embraced eventually took hold and came alive in the Civil Rights Era of the mid-twentieth century, Foner said.

Foner said the history of America is a tale of ups and downs, of rights granted and lost. The right to citizenship extended to anyone born in the United States has become controversial in recent years as immigration issues have heated up, he observed. It is a right that arose from the “titanic struggle” of the era of the Civil War and its aftermath, and it was one of the nation’s ways of addressing the legacy of slavery and the pervasive denial of rights to black people. Given how birthright citizenship has served the country, Foner said, “we should think long and hard before changing it.”

A version of Foner’s Boden Lecture will appear in 2013, in the next Marquette Lawyer.

Federal Indian Law—the legal provisions and doctrines governing the respective statuses of, and relations among, the federal, state, and tribal governments—is replete with seeming anomalies when compared to the background of typical domestic law in the United States. Such anomalies or aberrations, though frequently noted, have seldom if ever been systematically delineated in cases or in legal scholarship. The purpose of this and succeeding blog posts is to identify and examine several of these anomalies, the hope being that readers will gain a better sense of the unique topography of Federal Indian Law and at least some of the reasons that have brought it about.

Examined in this first post will be one such apparent anomaly, namely, the permissibility of the government’s differential treatment of Indian tribes and their members despite the U.S. Constitution’s guarantee of equal protection. This issue goes to the heart of Federal Indian Law, which is largely embodied as statutes in Title 25 of the U.S. Code (denominated “Indians”) and implemented through rules and regulations in Title 25 of the Code of Federal Regulations (also denominated “Indians”). To the extent that the classification of “Indian” ordinarily if not always includes a component of race, ethnicity, ancestry, or perhaps national origin, its use in the federal Code and Regulations—including its derivative use in judicial opinions—would seem presumptively to run afoul of constitutional as well as statutory proscriptions against discrimination on the basis of race, ethnicity, ancestry, and the like. After all, were one to encounter a Title of the U.S. Code designated “African Americans” or “Latinos” or “Germans,” an eyebrow, if not two, would almost certainly be raised in response. Read more »

Like my colleague Ed Fallone, I spoke at the Marquette Constitution Day program on Monday, September 17, sponsored by the Marquette Political Science Department. We were joined on the program by Marquette Political Science professors John McAdams and Paul Nolette. The program was centered around the concept of “Sticking to the Constitution.”

For the sake of brevity, I will simply summarize my arguments.

1. The text of the United States Constitution is more important as a symbol of our commitment to democratic government and the rule of law than it is as a source of answers to contemporary problems.

2. The United States Constitution of 1787 has lasted as long as it has because it is extremely brief and extremely vague. These characteristics allow it to be adapted to just about any position on any question, and has thus allowed significant changes to occur in the governmental structure of the United States without the need to alter the text of the constitution. Had it been more specific and detailed, it would have been repealed or substantially amended long ago.

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Yesterday, I spoke on a panel on the occasion of Constitution Day here at Marquette University.  What follows is a copy of my remarks: 

Today’s panel asks, “What does it mean to stick to the Constitution?”  This is another way of asking how we – you, me judges, lawmakers – should go about interpreting the meaning of the constitutional text.

Today, this interpretative question is often presented as a binary debate between either originalism or a “living Constitution.”

My argument today is that this clear dichotomy is nothing more than an illusion.  There is not a choice between two stark extremes.  This is because, in practice, most originalists and advocates of a living Constitution tend to meet in the middle.

So this debate between originalism and the living Constitution is often very loud and very energetic, but it tends to distract us from the real question.   Both sides of the debate behave as if the original intent of the Framers of the Constitution is important.  They argue very heatedly over how much weight to give to this original intent, in comparison to other factors such as changing circumstances or contrary precedent. Read more »

The Supreme Court’s decision upholding the constitutionality of the Affordable Care Act has generated a great deal of “instant analysis” on the web.  This post will survey some of the noteworthy commentary.

I have not read anything that has caused me to re-evaluate my initial reaction to the decision.  I thought that neither Justice Robert’s Commerce Clause analysis nor his Taxing Power analysis was particularly compelling, yet I was struck by the manner in which the Chief Justice managed to construct a 5-4 majority that paralleled Marbury v. Madison insofar as the ruling chastized a sitting President with its rhetoric while simultaneously handing the President a major policy victory.  Upon further reflection, I still believe that future Supreme Court justices will find it quite easy to evade the boundaries that the language of the NFIB v. Sebelius decision purports to place on federal government power.  All it will take is a change in one vote for a future Court to designate the opinion’s Commerce Clause analysis as “dicta,” or else to find the requisite level of coercion lacking the next time that Congress’ deploys its Spending Power in a similar fashion.  While the rhetoric of the opinion promises doctrinal limits on federal power, the actual holdings of the decision fail to deliver on that promise.

John Yoo has come to the same conclusion.  In an op ed piece in the Wall Street Journal he considers the spin that some political conservatives have placed on the Court’s ruling — that it was a victory for the advocates of limited governent — and finds these assertions to be no more than a ”hollow hope.”  He rejects the comparison to Marbury v. Madison, and instead compares the opinion of Justice Roberts to the “switch in time” that led the Supreme Court to uphold New Deal Era legislation during the Franklin Roosevelt Administration.  By frustrating the Supreme Court’s best chance since the 1930s to reverse what Yoo views as an anti-originalist acceptance of broad legislative power, Justice Roberts has let Professor Yoo down. Read more »

The decision in National Federation of Independent Business v. Sebelius is a victory for the supporters of the Affordable Care Act, and a fairly broad vindication for the constitutionality of the law.  Here are my initial thoughts:

This is a big win for the Obama Administration.  The only portion of the law struck down is the Medicaid expansion provision, on the grounds that Congress cannot threaten to take away funds previously granted to the States if the States fail to accept new conditions.  This strikes me as a fairly reasonable gloss on the case of South Dakota v. Dole and, at the same time, a constitutional interpretation that still allows Congress a fair amount of flexibility to attach conditions to the receipt of new federal dollars.

I am not persuaded by Justice Robert’s argument rejecting Congress’ power under the Commerce Clause.  It strikes me as primarily conclusory rather than analytical, and my initial reaction is that it should be considered dicta since Justice Roberts upholds the ACA on other grounds.  Of course, I have already made clear that I am inclined to agree with Justice Ginsburg that the Court’s precedent under the Commerce Clause provides ample support for the ACA’s constitutionality, as I argued in previous posts here and here.

Nor am I convinced by Robert’s tax argument.  He labors a great deal to make the case that the ACA does not impose a “tax” for purposes of the statutory Ant-Injunction Act but nonetheless imposes a “tax” under Congress’ constitutional taxing authority.

It appears to me that Roberts tried to split the baby in a statesman-like way, by giving victory to Obama but by using reasoning and language designed to placate President Obama’s critics.  Am I the only person who read Justice Robert’s opinion and thought of Marbury v. Madison?

Robust equality is a relatively recent part of the American constitutional landscape, rooted in a limited way in the Declaration of Independence and then formally embraced in the Constitution’s 14th Amendment, ratified in 1868, though it took another near century to buttress that guarantee with meaningful legal force. By contrast, liberty—e.g., of religious exercise, of speech, and of the press—and its attendant guarantee of non-deprivation without due process of law, go back to the nation’s founding if not decades and in some cases centuries before.

In recent years, however, with great domestic and international dynamics at work, there has ascended into prominence and influence a norm of equality or nondiscrimination, or an unabashedly pursued equality of outcome, effectively supplanting the centrality of individual or group liberty as the citizen’s core constitutional guarantees.

Part of this has been achieved by legitimate historical and other academic research and theorizing, though it should be noted that at times the neutrality of those undertaking such efforts may rightly be questioned. Part of this sea change, though, has come from a public and university-sanctioned tolerance for the suppression of viewpoints that conflict with the modern ethos of equality, variously defined. Many of these developments, moreover, have resulted from outside pressures—from interest groups to like-minded accrediting organizations—that seemingly leave the institutions with little choice but to comply with their dictates.

As repeatedly documented by, among others groups, the Foundation for Individual Rights in Education and the Center for Campus Free Speech, colleges and universities ironically have sometimes been the most egregious censors of speech under the banner of equality (or of perceived equal treatment), which perversely betrays a subordination of the time-honored values of truth-seeking and knowledge propagation to relatively fleeting interest-group pressures and ideological expediency.

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